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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CERCLA 
GENERATOR LIABILITY: ARE COURTS MAKING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT EASIER FOR PRPS? 
Bruce D. Wickersham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act! (CERCLA) in 1980 to address the 
threat to human health and the environment posed by unsafe disposal 
of hazardous waste.2 Congress sought to make those parties respon-
sible for unsafe disposal of hazardous wastes likewise responsible for 
* Executive Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Because the statute created the Hazardous 
Substance Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982), CERCLA is also known as "Superfund." 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). CERCLA authorizes the federal government to pursue "such 
relief as may be necessary" after a determination that "there may be an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility." [d. 
In enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress sought to provide the federal government 
immediately with tools necessary for prompt and effective response to the nationwide 
threat posed by hazardous waste disposal and to impose the costs and responsibility 
for remedial action upon the persons responsible for the creation of the hazardous 
waste disposal threat. 
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985). 
Although the magnitude and threat of the hazardous waste disposal problem is unclear, our 
society is deeply worried about toxic wastes. See Peter M. Sandman, Risk Communication: 
Facing Public Outrage, EPA J., Nov. 1987, at 21. According to Sandman, "outrage factors," 
among which are the memorability of incidents such as Love Canal and the power of a symbol 
such as a fifty-five gallon drum, create public perception of risk in excess of scientifically 
determined expected annual mortality. [d. at 22. Reinforcing societal fears is the fact that 
"[a]pproximately one of every four Americans live [sic] within a few miles of an active Superfund 
site." See Proposals to Reauthorize the Superfund Program: Hearings on H.R. 3800 Before the 
Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and 
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cleaning up the wastes and paying the bilts With these logical and fair 
principles in mind and in response to the national outrage over inci-
dents such as Love Canal,4 Congress rushed to pass CERCLA,5 and 
courts and commentators have blamed inconsistencies in the statu-
tory scheme on CERCLA's hasty passage.6 
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (remarks of EPA Administrator Carol Browner, Feb. 3, 
1994) [hereinafter Browner Statement]. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has finished evaluating about 24,000 sites and 
has begun evaluating another 9,000 sites. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 'IbTAL COSTS 
OF CLEANING Up NONFEDERAL SUPERFUND SITES 5 (1994) [hereinafter CBO, 'IbTAL COSTS 
OF CLEANING Up]. These sites represent 94% of the nonfederal sites brought to the EPA's 
attention as of the end of 1992. Id. After assessing and ranking sites, the EPA must list sites 
on the National Priorities List (NPL) in order to allocate resources for extensive cleanups to 
the worst sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1988) (outlining hazard ranking system); id. § 9616 (1988) 
(detailing assessment, prioritization, and listing procedures). The EPA has placed nearly 1,300 
of the worst sites on the NPL. CBO, 'IbTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP, supra, at ix, 1. Estimates 
of the ultimate number of sites that will have to be placed on the NPL range from 2,100 to 
10,000. Id. at 1 (citing MILTON RUSSELL ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE REMEDIATION: THE TASK 
AHEAD (1991»; JOHN A. HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK 7 (1994). 
Whatever the actual number of sites in need of extensive remediation turns out to be, the 
future cost of cleaning up will be enormous. See CBO, 'IbTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP, supra, 
at 35. Public and private sources had already spent $13 billion through 1992, but had completed 
construction work related to cleanup at only 149 of the NPL sites. Id. at 1. Moreover, only 40 
sites had been completely cleaned up. Id. The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) base esti-
mate assumes 4,500 nonfederal sites will be cleaned up. Id. at 13. The CBO assumes expenditure 
of an average of $4 million per site in "pre-remedial costs," including "removal actions, remedial 
investigations/feasibility studies, and remedial designs." Id. at 36. The CBO estimates average 
clean-up costs per site will be $21 million. Id. The CBO estimates total future public and private 
Superfund expenditures will be $74 billion. Id. at 35. The CBO recognizes that other researchers 
estimated that total Superfund clean-up costs would be $151 billion. Id. (citing E. WILLIAM 
COLGLAZIER ET AL., ESTIMATING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NPL SITES (1991». 
3 Superfund was structured on the principle that polluters should pay for cleanup. Browner 
Statement, supra note 2, at 196; see, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d 
Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Murtha II] (CERCLA's two primary goals are to respond expeditiously 
to toxic spills and to hold parties responsible for release liable for costs of cleanup); Mottola, 605 
F. Supp. at 902; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("the Act is 
intended to facilitate prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump sites and when possible to place 
the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger created by such sites"). 
4 See Superfund: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, EPA J., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 13, 14--15 (explain-
ing that passage ofCERCLA was response to national concern fueled by publicity of Love Canal 
in New York, Valley of the Drums in Kentucky, and Times Beach in Missouri). 
5 See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982). 
A lame duck Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 just before the anti-regulation Reagan admini-
stration moved into office. Id. 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) 
[hereinafter Alcan (3d Cir.)] ("CERCLA was passed in great haste during the waning days of 
the 96th Congress. As a result the statute is riddled with inconsistencies and redundancies."); 
Mottola, 605 F. Supp. at 902 ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-
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Despite CERCLA's grounding in fair principles, inartfully drafted 
liability provisions have created a far-reaching, and arguably unfair, 
scope ofliability.7 For example, critics argue that CERCLA's retroac-
tive effect is unfair.s Moreover, CERCLA's lack of a traditional causa-
tion requirement9 and the financially ruinous costs that attend impo-
sition of liabilitylO could create liability at odds with notions of 
fairnessY Finally, where CERCLA plaintiffs offer circumstantial evi-
dence to prove liability-the focus of this Comment-our legal system 
may be reluctant to impose a verdict not legitimated by direct evi-
dence.12 This Comment describes how courts have handled difficult 
drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."); Wade, 577 F. 
Supp. at 1331 ("Superfund legislation ... leaves much to be desired from a syntactical stand-
point, perhaps a reflection of the hasty compromises which were reached as the bill was pushed 
through Congress just before the close of its 96th session .... [T]he legislative history is 
unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements."). In order "to underscore the 
lack of precision with which the statute was drafted," one court pointed out that § 9607(a)(3) 
"could be read to impose liability on certain parties who merely arrange for transport of their 
waste but never actually do so." Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332 (showing possible construction of 
CERCLA's liability provisions leading to absurd result that generator could be liable though no 
waste ever went to site). 
7 "Superfund cleanups cost too much, take too long and often impose unjust and dispropor-
tionate costs on potentially responsible parties." 139 CONG. REC. E3041 (daily ed. Nov. 24,1993) 
(statements of Rep. Upton). See Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liability Under 
CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 821, 837 (1989) ("CERCLA's implementation has resulted in 
considerable litigation, coupled with the actual cleanup of only a handful of sites."). For back-
ground discussion of the parties covered by CERCLA liability and the strict, joint, and several 
nature of CERCLA liability, see infra part ILB. 
R See, e.g., Superfund Liability Issues: Hearings on H.R. 3800 Before the Subcomm. on 
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (statements of Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., Feb. 10, 1994) (remarking on 
unfairness of retroactivity where actions were legal at time of occurrence). 
Courts consistently hold that CERCLA's retroactive liability scheme is constitutional. See, 
e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) ("even if CERCLA is 
understood to operate retroactively, it nonetheless satisfies the dictates of due process because 
its liability scheme is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose"). 
9 See generally John C. Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV. 
1493 (1994) (providing history of legislative efforts to include tort-like proximate cause require-
ment in CERCLA, comparisons to proximate cause and market share liability schemes, judicial 
interpretation rejecting proximate cause requirement in CERCLA actions, and current propos-
als for changes to CERCLA's liability scheme). 
10 See CBO, ToTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP, supra note 2, at 36. The CBO's base estimate is 
that the average Superfund site will cost $25 million in total investigation and clean-up expenses. 
Id. CERCLA's strict, joint, and several liability provisions mean that a single party could be 
forced to pay the entire cost of remediation. See infra part n.B. 
11 For examples of CERCLA's unfair results, see Cathleen Clark, Note, Should the Butcher, 
the Baker and the Candlestick Maker Be Held Responsible for Hazardous Waste?, 1994 UTAH 
L. REV. 871, 872. 
12 See generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the 
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questions of CERCLA liability where the plaintiffs' cases turned on 
circumstantial evidence. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the type of factual situations 
in which courts face difficult decisions on the CERCLA liability of 
generator defendants. Firm A produced a waste stream that con-
tained some hazardous substances.13 Firm B, a waste hauler and a 
third party plaintiff14 seeking contribution from Firm A under CER-
CLA/5 presents evidence that fifty percent of the individual loads of 
waste generated by Firm A contained hazardous substances as 
defined by CERCLA. Although the plaintiff presents evidence that 
Firm B disposed of all waste generated by Firm A, the evidence also 
reveals that Firm B disposed of only fifty percent of the individual 
loads of waste taken from Firm A at the CERCLA site.16 Relying on 
the mathematical possibility that none of its hazardous waste reached 
the site, Firm A moves for summary judgment, arguing that the 
plaintiff has not met the burden of production of evidence.17 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1985) [hereinafter Nesson, Proof and Accept-
ability]. 
Cases of naked statistical proof present the most provocative example of probable 
verdicts that are unacceptable. In these cases, the evidence suggests a sufficiently high 
numerical probability of liability, but the absence of deference-inducing mechanisms in 
the judicial process is such that the public is unable to view a verdict against the 
defendant as a statement about what actually happened. 
Id. at 1378. 
13 Producing a waste stream containing hazardous substances does not automatically lead to 
CERCLA liability; persons who have arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at a facility 
from which there has been a release requiring response are among those liable under CERCLA. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). See also infra part II.B for a detailed discussion of the elements 
of CERCLA liability. 
14 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988), holds transporters of hazardous waste to a facility 
from which there has been a release liable for the costs of remediation. Firm B may have 
conceded threshold CERCLA liability but may be seeking to lower the cost of liability by 
impleading other defendants, such as Firm A. 
15 Under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988), parties that are jointly and severally liable 
under CERCLA may seek contribution from any party enumerated under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
The ability of private parties to seek reimbursement for response costs from all those respon-
sible for hazardous waste disposal at the litigated facility not only facilitates cost spreading, but 
allows private parties to initiate clean-up measures. See infra part II.B. 
16 There is no quantitative threshold for CERCLA liability. See infra text accompanying note 
83. Thus, direct proof that Firm A disposed of even a single load of hazardous waste at the 
facility would cause Firm B to prevail. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). In this hypothetical, however, 
there is still the mathematical possibility that none of Firm Ns hazardous waste reached the 
site. 
17 A summary judgment motion claims that because the nonmoving party has raised no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Here, although Firm A may concede that there is a facility, from which 
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Given these facts, a court's response to Firm Ns motion for sum-
mary judgment may not be predictable.1s Moreover, the clarity of fact 
assumed in the hypothetical is unlikely to be present in any litigated 
action,t9 further complicating an already difficult problem. 
This Comment looks at recent CERCLA cases to see how gener-
ator defendants whose disposal activities are not explained by direct 
evidence have fared in avoiding liability through summary judgment 
motions. CERCLA cases based on circumstantial evidence cannot be 
reduced, however, to certain, mechanical tests. Therefore, the second 
and more important goal of this Comment is to dissect and explain 
judicial behavior in this narrow realm of CERCLA liability cases. 
In more concrete terms, this Comment discusses how courts have 
behaved when a defendant, a potentially responsible party (PRP)20 as 
a generator defendant,21 moves for summary judgment by asserting 
that the defendant was not a "covered person" under CERCLA.22 By 
critically analyzing this narrow area of CERCLA jurisprudence, this 
Comment attempts to discern how courts are now reacting to the 
perceived unfairness in CERCLA liability. This Comment inquires 
there has been a release, which caused the plaintiff to incur response costs, Firm A denies 
disposing of any hazardous substances at the facility. See infra part II.A for a more detailed 
discussion of summary judgment. 
18 If the nonmoving party has not produced sufficient evidence to support a finding as to a 
contested element of the prima facie case, then no issue of material fact exists as to that element 
and the court may resolve the dispute as to that element in the defendant's favor. See Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); infra part II.A (discussing summary judgment 
standards); see also infra parts III and IV (discussing varying results from courts). 
19 See, e.g., Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1481-98 (E.D. Wis. 1994) 
(disputed factual cases against twelve "fast-track" generator defendants); Dana Corp. v. Ameri-
can Standard, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1503-35 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (disputed factual cases against 
10 generator defendants); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539, 541 (D. Conn. 1993) 
[hereinafter Murtha III] (where plaintiffs attempted to implead 1,151 third party defendants); 
United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 235-37 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
20 When the EPA finds that a site is contaminated seriously enough to warrant listing on the 
NPL, it will create a list ofPRPs, from whom the EPA seeks contribution for remediation costs 
pursuant to CERCLA's liability provisions. See generally Smith, supra note 7. CERCLA 
authorizes the government to seek reimbursement for response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. PRPs 
may be liable under CERCLA by falling within one of the four enumerated classes of covered 
parties: current owners of a facility, former owners of a facility, generators that disposed of 
hazardous waste at a facility, and transporters of hazardous waste to a facility. Id. § 9607(a). 
Thus, after a PRP admits to being or is proven to be a member of one of the enumerated classes, 
the party has the legal status of a covered person. See id.; see generally Smith, supra note 7. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). As a shorthand, this Comment will refer to PRPs alleged to have 
"arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances ... at any facility" as generator defendants. 
Id. 
22 Id. § 9607(a); see supra note 20. 
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whether courts, having seen inconsistencies in CERCLA and heard 
complaints about CERCLA's unfair liability scheme, are allowing 
more defendants to escape CERCLA liability at the summary judg-
ment stage by pointing out defects in the plaintiff's offer of proof. 
Section II.A briefly reviews the standard courts apply to motions 
for summary judgment. Section II.B delves into the statutory and 
judicial framework of CERCLA liability, and focuses specifically on 
the question of a generator defendant's status as a covered person or 
party under CERCLA. Section III provides background material on 
how courts have ruled on generator defendants' motions for summary 
judgment that point out the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence 
presented by plaintiffs. Section IV presents Acme Printing Ink Co. 
v. Menard, Inc.23 [hereinafter Acme] and Dana Corp. v. American 
Standard24 [hereinafter Dana] and the standards applied to circum-
stantial evidence of the generator defendants' status as covered per-
sons. Section V discerns in the judicial practices that culminate with 
Acme and Dana a subjective weighing of circumstantial evidence and 
an implicit process of discrediting inferences analogous to the "prod-
uct rule" from statistics. Section V concludes that to the extent judi-
cial treatment of circumstantial evidence of generator liability in 
Acme and Dana appears relatively sympathetic to generator defen-
dants, the perceived unfairness of the scope of CERCLA liability 
explains such a treatment. Finally, this Comment concludes that un-
spoken and SUbjective biases, implicit in CERCLA decisions and 
themselves reactions to CERCLA's perceived unfairness, will actually 
create a heightened perception of unfairness among litigants and 
therefore disserve our system. 
II. EVALUATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS By GENERATOR 
DEFENDANTS SEEKING To AVOID CERCLA LIABILITY 
A. Summary Judgment Standards 
A motion for summary judgment is potentially dispositive, that is, 
granting a summary judgment motion in full resolves the litigation on 
the merits in favor of the moving party.25 A defendant moving for 
summary judgment may argue that the plaintiff "has failed to make 
23 870 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
24 866 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
25 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 653 (3d ed. 1992). 
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a sufficient showing on an essential element of [the] case with respect 
to which [the plaintiff] has the burden of proof."26 Such factually 
insufficient claims should be prevented from going to trial "to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."27 
According to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
court should grant summary judgment on a finding that "the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."28 No genuine issue of material fact 
exists "[ w ]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party."29 The nonmoving party 
must come forward with more than a mere scintilla of evidence in 
support of its position.30 Evidence presented by the nonmoving party 
must be adequate to support a finding by a reasonable fact-finder.31 
The nonmoving party has not met the burden of production through 
presentation of "testimony that an event 'could have happened' or was 
'possible,"'32 or even that an event "must have" happened.33 
Nonetheless, the task of the defendant moving for summary judg-
ment is likely to be difficult because all allegations made by the 
nonmoving party must be taken as true, even where such allegations 
conflict with the allegations of the moving party.34 In addition, a "court 
must view the record and draw all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence in favor of the non-moving party."35 However, "[n]o genuine 
issue as to any material fact is created by 'evidence of purportedly 
disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire 
record."'36 As the party moving for summary judgment, a defendant 
has no burden to prove that the plaintiffs claims are untrue.37 A 
26 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "One of the principal purposes of the 
summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or de-
fenses .... " [d. at 323-24. 
'l:l [d. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
29 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 322-24. 
30 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
31 See 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338 (4th ed. 1992). 
32 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1489 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
33 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1488-89 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
34 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347 n.ll (1976); Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1492. 
35 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1492. 
36 [d. (quoting Czajowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1432 (N.D. Ill. 1992». 
37 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
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defendant need only point out that the plaintiff has presented in-
sufficient evidence to prove each element of the plaintiff's claim.38 
The question of whether a plaintiff has presented evidence 
sufficient to support a finding as to the required elements of a CER-
CLA claim is essential to ruling on a generator defendant's motion for 
summary judgment.39 To further clarify the phrase "evidence 
sufficient to support a finding," one court stated that "[t]he mere 
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving 
party's] position will be insufficient [to avoid summary judgment]; 
there must be evidence on which the [finder of fact] could reasonably 
find for the [nonmoving party]."40 Although a "mere scintilla" is in-
sufficient, the question of what is sufficient remains.41 Comparing the 
sufficiency standard, that is, the burden of producing evidence, to the 
higher burden of persuasion is one means of clarification.42 
The three generally accepted formulations for the burden of per-
suasion are, in order of decreasing stringency, "evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "a prepon-
derance of evidence."43 Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is 
proof establishing that the existence of a fact is more likely than the 
nonexistence of that fact.44 In other terms, proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence is proof establishing that the likelihood of the occur-
rence of an event is greater than fifty percent.45 Logically then, evi-
38 Id. at 325; Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1494. 
39 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1493 (applying summary judgment standards to CERCLA 
generator defendants' motions for summary judgment). 
Despite a generally applicable summary judgment standard, plaintiffs in CERCLA cases have 
argued that in light of CERCLA's remedial nature and pressing public policy concerns, summary 
judgment should be harder for defendants to attain in CERCLA litigation. See id. at 1492 
(discussing Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition). Nonetheless, courts have maintained that CERCLA 
does not change the summary judgment standard set out by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and judicial interpretation of that standard. See id. at 1493; Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 
833 F. Supp. 1163, 1198 (D.S.C. 1992); see also CBS, Inc. v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (N.D. 
Ind. 1992) (applying FED. R. CIV. P. standard to CERCLA litigation). Thus, in the generator 
cases that are the focus of this Comment, a plaintiff as nonmoving party must present evidence 
sufficient to support a finding in the plaintiff's favor as to each element of a CERCLA prima 
facie case. See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1493 (clearly breaking the prima facie CERCLA 
generator liability case into individual elements). 
40 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
41 See id. 
42 See 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 339. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at n.12. The "preponderance" standard can be classified as proof based on probability. 
Id. Such a classification raises problematic questions of assessing punishment without an actual 
belief in the truth of the matter asserted. Id. 
45 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Sum-
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dence sufficient to support a finding should be a lower standard than 
a preponderance of the evidence, and this relationship is embodied in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.46 Nevertheless, after the trio of 1986 
Supreme Court cases, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp. [hereinafter Matsushita],47 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. [hereinafter Liberty Lobby],48 and, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett [here-
inafter Celotex],49 a court may raise the plaintiffs burden of produc-
tion in two ways.5O 
First, a court may integrate the nonmoving plaintiffs burden of 
persuasion at trial into consideration of the summary judgment mo-
tion.51 In other words, in a typical civil action the court may try to 
predict whether the plaintiff will be able to prove each element by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 52 If the court determines that the 
plaintiff will be unable to meet the preponderance standard at trial, 
the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. 53 Thus, the 
burden of production at the summary judgment stage can be ratch-
eted up to a higher level equaling the burden of persuasion at trial. 54 
Second, a court may compare the plausibility of an inference drawn 
in the plaintiffs favor against the plausibility of an inference drawn 
in favor of the defendant. 55 Where a question has only two possible 
mary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95,175-76 
(1988). 
,46 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); see also 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 338. Thus, evidence 
may be sufficient to support a finding even though the evidence does not create a greater than 
50% likelihood. See Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 514 (1988) (providing guidelines illustrating that plaintiff should survive 
summary judgment if ''the plausibility of the plaintiff's inference" is greater than 10%). Prior 
to 1986, the proposition that a plaintiff would survive summary judgment merely by demon-
strating a conflict in the admissible proof of important facts was generally accepted. See Stem-
pel, supra note 45, at 144-59 (discussing case law and commentary prior to 1986). 
47 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
48 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
49 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
50 See generally Stempel, supra note 45 (analyzing impact of these cases). 
51 See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Stempel, supra note 45, at 104 (stating that the 
Court in Liberty Lobby "held that the party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate to 
the court the existence of a fact dispute that would support a verdict in its favor applying the 
substantive standard of proof to be used at trial"). 
52 See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 338. 
53 See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 338. 
M See Stempel, supra note 45, at 104. 
55 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574,596-97 (1986). Application of this comparison makes proof by 
circumstantial evidence extremely difficult. See Collins, Note, supra note 46, at 496-98. 
[An] inference of [inculpatory conduct] cannot be established by indirect evidence 
when the inference of innocent conduct is equally "as consistent" with the evidence. 
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answers, the plausibility of the positive inference is the complement 
of the negative inference. To survive summary judgment where a 
court compares inferences, the positive inference must appear more 
plausible.56 Therefore, the plaintiff must produce evidence essentially 
equaling a preponderance of the evidence. 57 
Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Celotex, taken together, "read like 
an ode to the wonders of summary judgment,"58 and "mak[ e] summary 
judgment easier to obtain and involv[e] trial judges in more activities 
that look suspiciously like pretrial factfinding."59 The fundamental 
policy behind summary judgments is to cut off baseless suits, thereby 
conserving judicial resources and protecting defendants from harass-
ment in courts.60 This policy may at times directly conflict with CER-
CLA's goal of accessing the largest possible source of clean-up fund-
ing.61 
In light of the expanded scope of judicial fact-finding authority, 
cases based on circumstantial evidence are especially vulnerable at 
the summary judgment stage.62 A generator defendant in a CERCLA 
liability suit will prevail at the summary judgment stage unless the 
This seems to engraft a procedural innovation onto [substantive] law by replacing the 
usual rule that a plaintiff is entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in her 
favor with a much stricter standard-one which looks, not at the outer limits of 
plausibility, but rather at the point of equipoise between the two competing hypothesis. 
It suggests that if the judge finds the inference of innocent conduct to be the more 
plausible one, he may grant summary judgment to the defendant. 
Id. at 497-98. 
56 See Collins, Note, supra note 46, at 497-98. 
57 See id. at 498. An illustration may help clarify this idea. One of the elements of a prima facie 
case against a generator defendant is showing that the defendant produced hazardous waste. 
See infra part II.B. Where the defendant actually produced waste and the plaintiff presents 
only circumstantial evidence about the nature of the waste, the only possible inferences are that 
the waste was hazardous, or that the waste was not hazardous. The probability of the positive 
inference-the waste was hazardous-is the complement of the negative inference-the waste 
was not hazardous. Stated differently, where the likelihood that the waste was hazardous is x, 
the likelihood the waste was not hazardous is (I-x). Thus, for the positive inference to be more 
plausible and survive the Matsushita test, its likelihood must be greater than 50%, or equal to 
a preponderance standard. 
58 Stempel, supra note 45, at 106. 
59Id. at 107-08. This expanded authority for trial judges to act as factfinders at the summary 
judgment stage is in tension with the trial judge's traditional role of resolving all contested facts 
in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. at 145 n.275. 
60 See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). With the advent of notice pleading, summary judgment 
has assumed the role formerly played by motions to dismiss, becoming a tool "by which factually 
insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the 
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. 
61 See infra parts II.B, VI. 
62 See 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 338. Circumstantial evidence 
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plaintiff has met the burden of production of evidence as to each one 
of the elements of CERCLA liability.63 Therefore, a thorough under-
standing of the elements of CERCLA liability is necessary. 
B. Statutory and Judicial Underpinnings of CERCLA Liability of 
Generator Defendants 
CERCLA grants broad authority to the Executive branch of the 
federal government64 to provide for the cleanup of sites containing 
hazardous substances that pose an imminent and substantial danger 
to human health or the environment.65 In particular, the government 
is authorized to respond to an imminent and substantial danger by 
removing or arranging for the removal of hazardous substances, pro-
viding for remedial action relating to such hazardous substances, and 
Id. 
requires a weighing of probabilities as to matters other than merely the truthfulness 
of the witness .... [I]n the last analysis the judge's ruling must necessarily rest on her 
individual opinion, formed in light of her own common sense and experience, as to the 
limits of inference from the facts proven. 
Surviving summary judgment is especially difficult in light of the Supreme Court's efforts in 
Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Celotex to make summary judgment more available to end 
litigation. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 100-08 (reviewing cases and resulting trend). Com-
menting on the influence of the Supreme Court summary judgment trio, Stempel states that, 
trial judges now have the Supreme Court approv[edl power to weigh and judge a 
nonmovant's facts as present but insufficient to persuade reasonable jurors. When this 
does not permit the judge to throw out the case, he or she may then examine the 
allegations made by claimant upon this admittedly conflicting record and deem the 
allegations and claimant's interpretation of defendant's conduct 'implausible.' ... The 
trial judges power under Liberty Lobby includes ... power to covertly enter judgment 
against particular litigants or claims that the judge disfavors. 
Id. at 167-68. In addition to the judge's ability to act instrumentally while factfinding at the 
summary judgment stage, Stempel also questions the legitimacy of deciding cases before the 
factual record is fully developed. See id. at 170-81. In particular, Stempel notes that "a judge's 
greater freedom to evaluate the quality of evidence seems ... likely to increase the likelihood 
of Type II error" which Stempel has defined as "wrongfully exonerating a defendant who is 
actually liable" or "false exculpation." Id. at 179--80. 
63 See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9615 (1988). CERCLA specifically grants authority to the President. See, 
e.g., id. § 9604 (granting response authority). To carry out the provisions of CERCLA, the 
President is also authorized to delegate and assign the duties imposed and powers granted by 
CERCLA. Id. § 9615. The President has delegated broad authority to the EPA. See, e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 12,580,52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. V 1993). 
65 CERCLA states that: 
[wlhenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of 
such a release into the environment, or (E) there is a release or substantial threat of 
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an 
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is 
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange 
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taking any other response measures consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan (NCP).66 
In anticipation of the enormous cost of dealing with the nation's 
hazardous waste problems, Congress established a fund to help pay 
for remediationY Congress was concerned that remedial action across 
the country would bankrupt even a "Superfund."68 To ensure funding 
for extensive remediation of hazardous waste problems, Congress 
sought to make those responsible for hazardous waste problems pay 
for cleanups.69 Congress provided public and private plaintiffs author-
ity to pursue civil actions against responsible parties for reimburse-
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contami-
nated natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the 
national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public 
health or welfare or the environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). 
Section 9606(c) requires the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate guidelines concerning 
imminent hazards, enforcement, and emergency response. [d. § 9606(c). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (enumerating types of response actions the government is authorized 
to undertake). The NCP, outlined in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a), requires the President to 
develop procedures for identifying, investigating, evaluating, and remedying hazardous sites. 
[d. § 9605(a). In addition, § 9605(a)(8)(B) mandates that the President develop the NPL, which 
performs a triage function in allocation of clean-up resources. See id. § 9605(a)(8)(B). Section 
9605(c) requires creation of a hazard ranking system to be applied in developing the NPL. See 
id. § 9605(c). 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (establishing Hazardous Substance Superfund); id. § 9611 (1988) 
(repealing 42 U .S.C. § 9631) (providing guidelines for uses of Superfund). Originally, part of the 
funding came from excise taxes on hazardous feedstock chemicals, crude oil, and imported 
petroleum products. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662, 4681 (1982) (amending Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954). General federal funds provided the balance of Superfund revenues. See 
42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982). 
In 1986, Congress passed amendments to CERCLA known as the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). Among other things, SARA 
dramatically increased funding to the Superfund, and extended the life of the program. See id. 
§ 9611; 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). 
fiB Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 518 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (reviewing legislative 
history). "[WJhile CERCLA authorizes governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites using 
money provided by the Superfund, the Superfund is limited and cannot finance cleanup of all 
the many hazardous waste sites nationwide." [d. "Congress knew when it enacted CERCLA 
that the costs of response activities would greatly exceed the Superfund." [d. (citing legislative 
history). 
69 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Kelley, 717 F. Supp. at 518 ("settlements of 
CERCLA cases in which the defendants agree to reimburse the Superfund for past expendi-
tures and to undertake work that would otherwise be funded with Superfund money are in the 
public interest"); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983) (citing legislative 
history) ("the legislative aims of CERCLA ... include goals such as cost-spreading and assur-
ance that responsible parties bear their cost of the clean up"). 
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ment of clean-up costs.70 To facilitate CERCLA's remedial goals by 
creating the largest possible funding pool, Congress designated an 
expansive array of parties as being liable for clean-up costS.71 Current 
owners of a facility, former owners of a facility, generators that have 
disposed of hazardous waste at a facility, and transporters of hazard-
ous waste to a facility are all liable pursuant to CERCLA.72 Congress 
maintained CERCLA's expansive liability scheme by enumerating 
only three limited, exclusive defenses: an act of God, an act of war, 
and an act or omission of a third party.73 
To effectuate Congress's intent to address an environmental cri-
sis, courts historically have been liberal in construing CERCLA as 
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9613(0. 
71 [d. § 9607(a). CERCLA provides that: 
[d. 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule oflaw, and subject only to the defenses 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, 
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government 
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with 
the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the 
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from a release; 
and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 
9604(i) of this title. 
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the 
amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). 
In fact, the long reach of CERCLA liability is frequently litigated. See Smith, supra note 7, at 
837 ("CERCLA's implementation has resulted in considerable litigation, coupled with the actual 
cleanup of only a handful of sites."). 
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(I)-(4). 
73 [d. § 9607(b) (1988). CERCLA provides that: 
[t]here shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise 
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat 
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a remedial statute imposing far-reaching liability against PRPS.74 
Carrying out this liberal construction of CERCLA, courts 
set forth a straightforward framework that requires a CERCLA 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case consisting of four ele-
ments.75 First, a plaintiff must show that the site is a CERCLA 
"facility."76 Second, the plaintiff must show there has been a 
"release" or "threatened release"77 of a "hazardous sub-
Id. 
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused 
solely by-
(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, 
or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, 
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual 
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by common 
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking 
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or 
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result 
from such acts or omissions; or 
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 
74 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992) 
[hereinafter Alcan (3d Gir.)] ("In response to widespread concern over the improper disposal 
of hazardous wastes, Congress enacted CERCLA, a complex piece of legislation designed to 
force polluters to pay for costs associated with remedying their pollution .... CERCLA is a 
remedial statute which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals."); B.F. Goodrich Co. 
v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Murtha IIJ ("In CERCLA Congress 
enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance the authority of the EPA to respond 
effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that threatened the environment and human 
health."). 
75 See, e.g., Alcan (3d Gir.), 964 F.2d at 2~9; United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 
872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 
1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989). 
76 See Alcan (3d Gir.), 964 F.2d at 2~9; Aceto Agric. Ghem., 872 F.2d at 1378-79; Ascon 
Properties, 866 F.2d at 1152-53. 
The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or 
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, 
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling 
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been 
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not 
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). 
77 Id. § 9601(22) (1988). 
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment 
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed 
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but 
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stance."78 Third, the plaintiff must show the release required the 
plaintiff to incur response costS.79 Finally, the plaintiff must show that 
Id. 
excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a work-
place. with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of 
such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, 
aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, 
or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to 
requirements with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission under section 170 of such act [42 U .S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes of 
section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct, 
or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(I) 
or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application offertilizer. 
7R See Alcan (3d Cir.) , 964 F.2d at 258-59; Aceto Agric. Chem., 872 F.2d at 1378-79; Ascon 
Properties, 866 F.2d at 1152-53. 
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to 
section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or 
substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste 
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation 
of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been sus-
pended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 
33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 
U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with 
respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 
15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof 
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under 
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural 
gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or 
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas). 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). 
The Administrator of the EPA may also create regulations designating other hazardous 
substances. 
The Administrator shall promulgate and revise as may be appropriate, regulations 
designating as hazardous substances, in addition to those referred to in section 9601(14) 
of this title, such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, 
when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare or the environment, and shall promulgate regulations establishing 
that quantity of any hazardous substance the release of which shall be reported 
pursuant to section 9603 of this title. 
Id. § 9602(a) (1988). 
A list of hazardous substances appears in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 
(1994). 
79 See Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 258-59; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989). The response actions and costs incurred by private 
plaintiffs must have been consistent with the NCP as administered by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). In actions brought by the government, response actions and costs need only 
have been not inconsistent with NCP standards. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Although most courts have 
allocated the burden of showing that response costs were inconsistent with the NCP to defen-
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the defendant falls within one of the classes of "covered," or respon-
sible, parties or persons as defined by the statute.SO 
Much CERCLA litigation involves disputes over the status of the 
defendant as a "covered" party or person.B! Four aspects of the judi-
cial gloss on the definition of a "covered" party facilitate a plaintiff's 
case.82 First, as long as any amount of a substance designated as 
hazardous is found at the site, liability may attach; there is no mini-
mum quantitative threshold for hazardous substances.83 Second, as 
long as generic hazardous substances like those the defendant dis-
posed of at the site are found, liability may attach.84 There is no 
requirement that a CERCLA plaintiff "fingerprint" hazardous sub-
stances found at the site and prove that specific substances came from 
the defendant.85 Third, as long as hazardous substances like those the 
defendant disposed of at the site were present at the site at the time 
of release, liability may attach; the defendant's hazardous waste need 
not have triggered the release or threatened release.86 Finally, a de-
dants, other courts have put the burden of showing consistency on the plaintiff. See In re Bell 
Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 906 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing case law and allocation of 
burden). 
"0 See Alcan (3d Gir.) , 964 F.2d at 258-59; Aceto Agric. Ghem., 872 F.2d at 1378-79; Ascon 
Properties, 866 F.2d at 1152-53. 
CERCLA imposes liability on generators, or parties that arranged for disposal of hazardous 
waste at a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Judicial response to the question of whether a 
defendant is a responsible party as a generator under § 9607(a)(3) is the focus of this Comment. 
In part III this Comment attempts to explain the elements of generator responsibility, in part 
by deconstructing the statutory language into two parts: 1) that the defendant disposed of waste 
at the facility, and 2) that waste the defendant disposed of at the facility was hazardous. See 
infra part III. 
H! See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1481 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("fast-track" defendants denying 
covered person status); Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1503 (N.D. Ind. 1994); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. 
Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180, 183-91 (D. Conn. 1993) [hereinafter Murtha IV]; United States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 235-36 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
82 See cases cited infra notes 83-88. 
H:l See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 1993) [herein-
after Alcan II (2d Gir.)]; Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D. Ariz. 1991); 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States 
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
84 United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
85 See, e.g., id. To make the plaintiff link the specific waste of the defendant to the release 
would be tremendously burdensome on the plaintiff and would defeat the liability scheme 
Congress created to keep the costs of remediation from falling on the taxpayers. United States 
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1402 (D.N.H. 1985) (a plaintiff need not "match the 
waste found to each defendant as if it were matching fingerprints"); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332 
("to require a plaintiff under CERCLA to 'fingerprint' wastes is to eviscerate the statute"). 
86 See, e.g., Alcan II (2d Gir.), 990 F.2d at 721; Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 742, 746 
(D. Ariz. 1992) ("the issue of causation would involve a factual determination of not whether 
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fendant cannot raise equitable defenses to threshold liability,87 al-
though such considerations may affect apportionment of costS.88 
After a plaintiff has established that a defendant is liable under 
CERCLA,89 the defendant is strictly,90 jointly, and severally91 liable. 
As provided by statute and judicial application, a defendant may 
defendants' hazardous waste caused response costs, but, rather, whether a release or threatened 
release caused plaintiffs to incur response costs"). The proposition that the defendant's waste 
need not have caused the release or the plaintiffs incursion of response costs is well settled. 
See, e.g., Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1992) ("virtually every court that has 
considered [the causation] question has held that a CERCLA plaintiff need not establish a direct 
causal connection between the defendant's hazardous substances and the release or the plain-
tiffs incurrence of response costs"). Nevertheless, defendants continue to seek to avoid liability 
by denying proximate causation. See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1481 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see 
also Nagle, supra note 9, at 1498-99 (arguing merits of traditional tort model). 
87 See, e.g., United States v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp., 823 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. Colo. 
1993) (denying equitable defenses to county and holding that defenses enumerated in § 9607(b) 
are exclusive); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1546 (E.D. Cal. 
1992) (reviewing both cases allowing and precluding equitable defenses) ("Cases precluding 
equitable defenses are more persuasive than those allowing the defenses for the simple reason 
that the former comport with the statute while the latter do not."); United States v. Davis, 794 
F. Supp. 67, 71 (D.R.I. 1992) (commenting that court in United States v. Conservation Chemical 
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1985), was mistaken to ignore expressly restrictive 
statutory language when allowing equitable defenses and directly overruling holding in Violet 
v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986), that had allowed equitable defenses). 
il8 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) ("court may allocate response costs among liable parties using 
such equitable factors as ... are appropriate"). 
89 Any person or party that as a matter of law is found to be a member of the enumerated 
categories, current and former owners, generators, and transporters, is liable under CERCLA. 
Id. §§ 9607(a)(I)-(4). This Comment uses "covered" and "responsible" interchangeably. A "po-
tentially responsible party" or a "generator defendant" has not been found to be a member of 
the categories enumerated in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(I)-(4), as a matter of law. See 
Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 258-59; United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 
1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
!lO See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
& Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). Strict liability 
means that liability attaches regardless of the defendant's intent, inability to foresee the site at 
which hazardous substances would be disposed, and lack of participation in the ultimate release. 
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 75, at 536 (5th 
ed.1984). 
91 See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 
1563, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 
(W.D. Mich. 1987), a/I'd sub nom. United States v. R.w. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 
810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
Joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to recover all damages from any individual 
defendant. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 90, § 47, at 328-30. The defendant against whom a 
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attempt to defeat liability,92 to seek contribution for clean-up costs,93 
or to limit the extent of liability by proving the harm caused was 
divisible.94 In any of these three strategies, the defendant bears the 
burden of proof.95 To defeat its liability, a defendant must show the 
release occurred because of an act of God, an act of war, or an act or 
omission of a third party.96 Courts have construed this statutorily 
provided defense very narrowly.97 As an alternative strategy under 
the statutory scheme, a defendant may seek contribution by proving 
the liability of other PRPs.98 Beyond the statutory provisions, a de-
fendant may proceed under the common law right to limit liability by 
proving divisibility of harm and thereby reduce financial exposure to 
the discrete costs associated with remediation of the defendant's own 
judgment is imposed bears the burden of seeking contribution from other parties. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (enumerating defenses). 
93Id. § 9613(f). 
94 See cases cited infra note 99. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (allocating burden of proving statutorily enumerated defenses to defen-
dant); United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646, 658 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (allocat-
ing burden of proving divisibility to defendant). In an action for contribution, the defendant 
becomes plaintiff against another defendant with original burden of making out a prima facie 
case. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), contains language severely restrict-
ing the third party defense, and is reinforced by stringent requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). 
Id. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3). Section 9601(35) forces defendants to act with heightened care and 
thoroughness in order to preserve the third party defense at all. See id. Although Congress 
added § 9601(35) in 1986 to provide safe haven from liability to innocent landowners, litigants 
have found little comfort there. See Browner Statement, supra note 2, at 208 ("this provision of 
the law has not functioned effectively"); see also L. Jager Smith, Jr., Note, CERCLA's Innocent 
Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 160-70 (1993) (analyzing 
cases). 
97 See, e.g., Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1539-40 (E.D. Cal. 1992) 
(narrowly construing third party defense). Indeed, the third party defense only applies if the 
harm was caused solely by a third party, and this defense is frequently litigated. See, e.g., United 
States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (disallowing defense alleging that 
third party was proximate, though not sole, cause of injury to plaintiff); see Nagle, supra note 
9, at 1538 (citing cases, stating that third party defense is most often litigated, and advocating 
expansion of defenses). 
98 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). CERCLA provides that: 
Id. 
[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under 
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title .... In resolving contri-
bution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such 
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. 
Of course, in such an action the defendant would bear the same burdens of proof that were 
demanded of a plaintiff. See supra note 95. 
1995] GENERATOR LIABILITY 139 
wastes.99 In summary, because of the enormous costs associated with 
i CERCLA liability and the difficult burdens of minimizing that liabil-
ity, CERCLA defendants have a strong incentive to avoid imposition 
of threshold liability. 
III. DEFENSE STRATEGY: DENYING THAT DEFENDANT Is A 
COVERED PERSON UNDER CERCLA 
One strategy for avoiding imposition of threshold liability is for a 
generator defendant to deny that the plaintiff has met the burden of 
producing evidence showing that the defendant is a person or party 
covered by CERCLA liabilityYJO The defendant's status as a covered 
or responsible party or person may be the only element of CERCLA 
liability not admitted, as in the hypothetical presented above1Ol and 
several generator cases.102 The other elements of a prima facie case of 
CERCLA liability may be conceded: the site is a "facility,"103 from 
which there has been a "release"104 of "hazardous substance[s],"105 that 
caused the incursion of response costS.106 Because the other three 
elements are conceded, determining whether the defendant is a cov-
ered person under CERCLA takes on greater importance and there-
fore merits close scrutiny. 
Stripped to its basic elements, the statute provides that "any per-
son who . . . arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person ... at any facility ... 
shall be liable . . . ."107 Upon closer scrutiny, this provision can be 
de constructed into two parts. First, the plaintiff must show that the 
99 See, e.g., Alcan II (fed Cir.), 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993); Wedzeb Enterprises, 809 F. 
Supp. at 658. 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Such a denial may take the form of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings in the early stages of litigation. See FED. R. Cry. P. 12(c). A motion made after 
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any," is a summary judgment motion. FED. R. Cry. P. 56(c). A defendant may make 
a motion for summary judgment at any time. FED. R. Cry. P. 56(b). 
101 See supra part I. 
102 See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1481 (E.n. Wis. 1994) ("fast-track" defendants denying 
covered person status); Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1503 (N.n. Ind. 1994); Murtha Iv, 619 F. Supp. 
162, 235-36 (w.n. Mo. 1985). 
lOa See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); supra note 76. 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22); supra note 77. 
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); supra note 78. 
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
107 [d. §§ 9607(a)(3), (4). 
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant disposed of a hazardous substance at the site, 
and that generic hazardous substances like those in the defendant's waste were present at the 
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defendant disposed of waste at the site. lOS Second, the plaintiff must 
show that some part of the waste was "hazardous."l09 Because both 
parts are necessary and independent, failure to meet the burden 
of production of evidence as to either element will be fatal for the 
plaintiff.uo 
In a case where the plaintiff attempts to prove one or both of these 
parts through presentation of circumstantial evidence, the court will 
have to determine how permissive to be in drawing inferences of 
sufficiency as to each part.111 Moreover, from these intermediate in-
ferences, the court must determine whether to draw the ultimate 
inference that a defendant is liable under CERCLA.ll2 Some degree 
of certainty as to each intermediate inference must underly the ulti-
site when the release occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 n.15 
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1493 (N.D. Ind. 1994); 
Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 912, 914 (D. Mass. 1992), supple-
mented by 867 F. Supp. 78 (1994); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 191 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 840 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("The 
minimal causal nexus required by CERCLA is met when the plaintiff proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant's hazardous waste was deposited at the site and that 
the substances contained in the defendant's waste were also found at the site."). 
108 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1493. 
109 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous"); supra note 78. 
110 See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
Proof by direct evidence that a generator disposed of hazardous waste should make that 
generator liable under CERCLA as a matter of law. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09. 
Nonetheless, courts have created the additional requirement that a plaintiff must show that 
generic substances like those hazardous substances in the defendant's waste were present at 
the site at the time of release. See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1493 (citing seven CERCLA cases 
standing for this proposition). See also infra note 276 discussing analytical foundations for this 
requirement. This requirement is rarely a difficult hurdle for a plaintiff because Superfund sites, 
by definition, are the largest and most contaminated sites, and often contain a plethora of 
hazardous substances. See CBO, ToTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP, supra note 2, at 2; see, e.g., 
United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 182-83 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (presenting 
extensive list of hazardous substances found at site). 
111 See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489; see also id. at 1503-35 (ruling on sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence against generator defendants). 
112 The following diagram clarifies the terminology used in this Comment: 
Circumstantial evidencedisposal: Circumstantial evidence showing some of Defendant's waste 
was disposed of at the facility. 
Intermediate inferencedispoBa1: Some of Defendant's waste was disposed of at the facility. 
Circumstantial evidencehazardous: Circumstantial evidence showing Defendant's waste con-
tained some hazardous substances. 
Intermediate inferencehazardous: Defendant's waste contained some hazardous substances. 
Ultimate Inference: Defendant disposed of hazardous substances at the facility. 
Traditionally courts purportedly refused to draw an inference on an inference, but recent 
jurisprudence has recognized that strict application of such a prophylactic rule would make 
every case nearly impossible. See 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 338, at 435 n.13. Courts 
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mate inference.u3 The crucial factor in CERCLA generator cases 
involving circumstantial evidence is how permissive courts are in 
drawing each intermediate inference, and then allowing the ultimate 
inference.114 
A. Inferring That Defendant Disposed of Waste at the Facility 
The first element necessary to imposing liability on a generator 
defendant is showing that the defendant's wastes were disposed of at 
the site.115 As outlined in the hypothetical,116 the defendant's waste 
may have been disposed of at multiple sites by multiple waste haulers 
over the course of several years. Adding to this factual complexity, 
there may be no records probative of the disposal issue, and testimony 
taken in discovery many years after the fact may leave the question 
unresolved.1l7 In such situations, courts must determine whether to 
infer from the indirect evidence presented that the defendant's waste 
actually reached the facility.118 
are still unwilling to stack inferences that are not well grounded in fact, or allow inferences that 
amount to statements that "anything's possible." See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1497-98. 
113 The importance of deconstructing the plaintiffs burden into two separate elements is 
stressed in an analogy from statistics in part V. See infra part V. Put in simplest form, where 
two events are statistically independent, the likelihood that both will occur is the product of the 
likelihood that each will occur. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual 
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1971) (providing rigorous statistical back-
ground). This "product rule" of probability theory confirms the visceral intuition that the 
likelihood of both events occurring may be small where the likelihood of each event is seriously 
in doubt. See id. For example, if the probability of A is 1/2 and the probability of B is 112, the 
probability of AB is 1/4. Id. 
This Comment will not attempt to quantify probability in CERCLA generator cases or 
question case outcomes based on possible misuse of statistics. See infra part V. Part V argues, 
however, that a form of balancing analogous to the "product rule" is a means by which courts 
discredit plaintiffs inferences in CERCLA generator liability cases. See infra part V. To the 
extent that this process is rooted in providing justification for a socially desired result, other 
legal commentary on the use of statistics in jurisprudence is relevant. See generally Daniel 
Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
530 (1989) (arguing that social acceptability, not accuracy, is main requisite for judicial decision); 
Nesson, Proof and Acceptability, supra note 12; Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and 
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979). 
114 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1497-98. 
115 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 13-17. 
117 See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1504 (shipping orders and waste hauler testimony inade-
quate to prove disposal of American Standard's aerosal cans at facility). 
118 See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465, 1485--86 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (considering circumstantial 
evidence of disposal by defendants Cambridge Chemical and Cardinal Fabricating). 
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In United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. [hereinafter Con-
servation Chemical],119 the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri found there was enough evidence to support 
the inference that the generator defendants' waste reached the liti-
gated facility.120 The court based denial of the generator defendants' 
motion for summary judgment largely on the fact that these defen-
dants arranged for disposal of waste through a "suspect waste 
hauler."121 In justifying the denial of the defendants' motions, the court 
reasoned that to cut off the plaintiff's case at summary judgment 
stage would be premature,l22 especially because granting summary 
judgment was "a drastic remedy."l23 
In addition, the Conservation Chemical court cited authority to 
bolster the proposition that a plaintiff need present relatively little 
evidence of disposal at the facility to survive a generator defendant's 
motion for summary judgment in a CERCLA action.124 In United 
States v. Wade, the court denied the generator defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.125 Although the affidavit of the president of the 
waste-hauling firm-who was a convicted felon and defendant in the 
case-was all the evidence of disposal presented, the court held that 
the disposal issue should be decided at trial.126 
In United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc. 127 and Conservation Chemi-
cal,128 the generator defendants conceded that their wastes had been 
shipped to the facilities in question, but contended without success 
that the wastes had been removed or transhipped before the site was 
119 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
120 See id. at 236-37. 
121 [d. at 236. 
122 [d. at 236-37. 
123 See id. at 180. 
124 Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 236; United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 
(D.N.I. 1983). The court in Price denied summary judgment to the defendant despite the fact 
that "evidence compiled by the [plaintiff] is not overwhelming." 577 F. Supp. at 1116. Price can 
be distinguished from purely circumstantial cases because the plaintiff produced direct evi-
dence, namely "three loading tickets indicating that waste chemicals generated by [the defen-
dant] ended up at [the site]" and the corroborating testimony of a waste hauler. See id. 
125 United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
126 [d. at 1331. The generator defendants, in addition to arguing that the affidavit was not 
reliable, also argued that the declarant lacked personal knowledge that the defendants' waste 
were disposed of at the facility. [d. The court was troubled by this issue but, finding that the 
declarant had enough personal knowledge to justify admission of the affidavit, held that the 
testimony should be weighed at trial. [d. at 1331-32. 
127 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985). 
128 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
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listed under CERCLA.129 The generator defendants in United States 
v. Monsanto130 attempted the same maneuver with an equal lack of 
success.13l In these situations the defendants' offers of evidence to 
prove removal of the waste was not enough to overcome the inference 
that at least some of the defendants' wastes remained at the site.132 
In general, courts had been willing to infer that a defendant dis-
posed of waste at a facility as long as there was some slight circum-
stantial evidence to support such a finding. 133 
B. Inferring That Defendant's Waste Was Hazardous 
The second element necessary for imposing liability on a generator 
defendant is showing that the defendant's wastes were hazardous.134 
Once again, direct evidence in the form of records and testimony may 
be difficult to discover and plaintiffs may have to rely on circumstan-
tial evidence.13S Given a lack of direct evidence, a plaintiff may ask the 
court to make inferences either about the hazardous nature of a 
specific item of waste136 or about the likely existence of hazardous 
substances in a generic stream of waste.137 
1. Inferring That Specific Items of Waste Are Hazardous 
The circumstances of a case may require a court to infer whether 
a specific item of waste is hazardous.188 Whether the waste contained 
129 See Ottati, 630 F. Supp. at 1403; Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 237. If true, such 
facts could prevent the plaintiff from showing both the disposal at the facility and the presence 
of hazardous substances like those in the defendant's waste at the time of release. See Ottati, 
630 F. Supp. at 1403; Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 237. 
130 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). 
131 See id. at 170-71. 
1:12 See id. at 171; Ottati, 630 F. Supp. at 1403; Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 237. 
133 See, e.g., Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 236-37 (association with suspect waste 
hauler enough to defeat summary judgment). 
134 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. This Comment uses the term hazardous 
without quotation marks as meaning hazardous for CERCLA purposes. 
135 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 972 (D. Conn. 1991) [hereinafter 
Murtha I] (presenting expert testimony that municipal waste generally contains hazardous 
waste and arguing therefore defendant's municipal waste contained hazardous substances), 
a/I'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
136 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. 591, 595--97 (D. Del. 1991); 
United States v. Serafini, 750 F. Supp. 168, 170-71 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
137 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Conn. 1993) [hereinafter Murtha 
III]; United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., No. 91-5118, 1993 WL 518421, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 7, 1993). 
las See, e.g., New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. at 595--97; Serafini, 750 F. Supp. at 170-71. 
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a hazardous substance is easy to determine where the defendant 
concedes the presence of the material and statutes139 or regulations140 
designate the material as hazardous. However, a defendant may dis-
pute that statutes and regulations cover a specific substance, and such 
a dispute may require judicial interpretation of the definition of a 
hazardous waste.141 
As a threshold matter, some problems concerning definition of a 
substance as hazardous may result from vague statutory language.142 
In Conservation Chemical,143 the court noted that, taken literally, 
CERCLA liability could attach where a defendant disposed of a 
pound of copper pennies at a facility from which there was a release. l44 
CERCLA liability is possible because copper is listed as a hazardous 
substance, there is no quantitative threshold, and there is no causa-
tion requirement.145 Furthermore, because there is no quantitative 
threshold, in United States v. Alcan Aluminum COrp.146 [hereinafter 
Alcan II (2nd Cir.)], a solution disposed of by the defendant was 
hazardous despite a concentration of hazardous substances in the 
solution allegedly less than the naturally occurring background levels 
of such substances.147 
Some courts have read CERCLA's hazardous substance definition 
in a way that was favorable to generator defendants. In Gallagher v. 
T.V Spano Building COrp.,148 the defendant's disposal of construction 
1a942 U.S.C. § 9601(14); see supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
140 Specific substances are designated as hazardous in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 
C.F.R. § 302.4 (1994). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a), authorizes the EPA to promUlgate such 
regulations. 
141 See, e.g., Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant argued that concen-
tration of hazardous substance in waste solution was below naturally occurring background 
level; court held that substance was hazardous). 
142 See, e.g., id. 
143 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
144 Id. at 195-96 (noting the pound requirement is imposed by EPA regulations for some 
hazardous substances). 
145 Id. An even more absurd result is possible through literal interpretation of CERCLA. See 
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The statute would impose 
liability on anyone who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at a facility; taken literally, 
there is no requirement that the defendant's hazardous waste ever reached the facility. Id.; see 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Fortunately, courts have applied canons of judicial construction to pre-
clude this absurd result. See Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332 (contemplating and rejecting this 
reading of CERCLA). 
146 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993). 
147Id. at 720; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) 
[hereinafter Alcan I (2d Cir.)] (where court addresses defendant's argument on concentration), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993). 
148 805 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Del. 1992). 
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debris under a site resulted in a dangerous plume of methane gas 
seeping into newly constructed homes.149 Although the release caused 
clear danger to the homeowners-who had to evacuate their homes-
and required subsequent remediation, and although under Delaware 
law the defendant had disposed of hazardous waste, no CERCLA 
liability attached because the waste did not fit the technical definition 
of a hazardous substance.15o Similarly, in Jastram v. Phillips Petro-
leum CO./51 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana found that the defendant did not dispose of a hazardous 
substance by releasing brine and saltwater.152 The court reached this 
finding despite the status of those substances as pollutants or con-
taminants, and an EPA memorandum advocating CERCLA liability 
in such situations.15H 
A different type of determination is required when a substance 
disposed of by the generator defendant has a hazardous constituent 
but is not explicitly listed as a hazardous substance.IM Here, a court 
must decide how permissive to be in inferring that the hazardous 
constituent separated from the waste while at the site.155 In both 
United States v. New Castle County and United States v. Serafini, the 
question was whether the defendants' wastes were hazardous by 
virtue of having hazardous constituents.156 In New Castle County, the 
defendant's waste product was not hazardous because the unusual 
conditions necessary to release the constituent were unlikely to be 
present at the site.157 In Serafini, because an intervening factor was 
149 [d. at 1122. 
150 [d. at 1122-23, 1128. 
151 39 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1375 (E.D. La. 1994). 
152 [d. at 1376. 
11>1 [d. at 1376-77. Part of the confusion in Jastram resulted from the fact that CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C. § 9604(a), authorizes the government to take response actions when a release of pollut-
ants or contaminants creates a threat to human health or the environment. See Jastram, 39 
Env't Cas. Rep. at 1377. CERCLA, however, only imposes liability for disposal of hazardous 
substances. 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(3). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. 591, 596 (D. Del. 1991); United 
States v. Serafini, 750 F. Supp. 168, 170 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
155 A plaintiff may be able to show that the hazardous constituent element was present at the 
site at the time of release and, therefore, argue that, while at the site, the hazardous substance 
disassociated itself from the manufactured product disposed of by the defendant. See, e.g., New 
Castle County, 769 F. Supp. at 596; Serafini, 750 F. Supp. at 170. 
156 New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. at 597; Serafini, 750 F. Supp. at 171. 
157 New Castle County, 769 F. Supp at 598. In New Castle County, the defendant disposed of 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) resin used in its plastics manufacturing operation. [d. at 594. Vinyl 
chloride, a listed CERCLA hazardous substance, is polymerized or chemically linked to form 
PVC. [d. at 597. The plaintiff contended that because every molecule would not bond during 
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necessary to cause the hazardous constituent to disassociate from the 
manufactured product, the court was unwilling to designate the 
manufactured product as hazardous.158 The Serafini court took this 
position in spite of the fact that the necessary intervening factor-
fire-was a common occurrence at the site.159 
In contrast to cases where courts were unwilling to infer that a 
specific item of waste was hazardous, in United States v. Carolawn 
CO.,160 the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina inferred that the defendant's waste product was hazardous 
because the hazardous constituent elements were likely to disassoci-
ate.161 The court permitted the inference that disassociation was likely 
to occur because the materials involved were mixtures.162 Through 
this inference the court defined the waste product as hazardous.163 
polymerization, trace amounts of unreacted vinyl chloride monomer in the defendant's pvc 
would have separated from the PVC in the landfill. Id. The court reviewed highly technical 
expert testimony in considering whether conditions at the landfill were such that the vinyl 
chloride would have migrated from the PVC. Id. The court stated that heating PVC in a vacuum 
was an example of a condition that would release the unbonded vinyl chloride. Id. The court 
went on to find that the testimony of the plaintiffs experts was insufficient to establish that a 
necessary condition in fact occurred at the landfill. Id. at 598. The court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the vinyl chloride issue despite the conceded presence of vinyl 
chloride at the facility. Id. Thus, the court was unwilling to make the inference that the 
separation actually occurred. See id. 
15il Serafini, 750 F. Supp. at 171 (scrap products from Capitol Records would release hazardous 
substances when burned, but the EPA had not yet listed product as hazardous). 
159Id. at 170. The court in Serafini found that the EPA, and not the court, had discretion to 
designate as hazardous materials that would break down into hazardous components under 
certain conditions. See id. at 171. Part of the court's reasoning relied on the assumption that fire 
would consume the disassociated hazardous element. See id. Given that assumption, the court 
appeared unwilling to infer that the hazardous constituent element would be present at the site. 
See id. 
160 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). 
161 See id. (holding that water-based paint waste solution was hazardous because it was a 
mixture containing hazardous substances and it defied reason to distinguish between a mixture 
and its constituent elements). 
Hi2 See id. In United States v. New Castle County, the court made a thorough review of cases 
dealing with the issue of hazardous constituent elements. United States v. New Castle County, 
769 F. Supp. 591, 596 (D. Del. 1992). The court cited Carolawn with approval as an example 
where a mixture containing hazardous constituents should be categorized as hazardous. New 
Castle County, 769 F. Supp. at 596. The court stated that a mixture consists of two or more 
substances that retain their essential original properties and these individual components are 
easily separated from the mixture. Id. Because the hazardous components separate or disasso-
ciate from the manufactured product readily, the court would be willing to infer that the 
separation occurred at the site. See id. Thus, the manufactured product is hazardous. See id. 
16:3 See Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2126. 
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In addition, in both United States v. Alcan Aluminum Gorp.l64 
[hereinafter Alcan I (2nd Gir.)] and United States v. Western Proc-
essing GO.,165 the defendants' wastes were held to be hazardous 
substances by virtue of having hazardous constituents.166 The plain-
tiffs were unable to demonstrate that separation actually oc-
curred, but such demonstrations were unnecessary because of the 
likelihood that disassociation or release would occur.167 The likeli-
hood of occurrence permitted the inference that the substances were 
hazardous.168 
Thus, complex inferences are sometimes necessary to establish 
even such basic facts as whether a specific item of waste is hazard-
OUS.169 Although complex, these inferences are at least based on the 
factual certainty that the specific item in question was present in the 
defendant's waste.170 In other instances, the court is asked to speculate 
about the presence of items in a waste stream.171 
2. Inferring That a Generic Stream of Waste Is Hazardous 
In contrast to questions about a specific substance, a different 
problem arises where a plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence to 
prove the presence of a hazardous substance in a stream of waste, 
164 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). 
165 734 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Wash. 1990). 
166 In Alcan I (2d Cir.), the court held that the defendant's emulsion was a hazardous sub-
stance because of minute amounts of heavy metals in the emulsion. The court held in that way 
despite the defendant's contention that there was a lower level of heavy metals in the emulsion 
than occurred as natural background levels. See Alcan I (2d Cir.), 755 F. Supp. at 540. In Western 
Processing, the court held that the defendant's waste, non-hazardous oxazolidine liquid mixed 
with trace amounts of arsenic, was hazardous. Western Processing, 734 F. Supp. at 932-33, 
942-43. 
167 See Alcan I (2d Cir.) , 755 F. Supp. at 540; Western Processing, 734 F. Supp. at 932-33, 
942-43; Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2126. Thus, where mixtures were involved the 
inference that the hazardous substance would separate from the solution was not troubling for 
the court. See Alcan I (2d Cir.), 755 F. Supp. at 540; Western Processing, 734 F. Supp. at 932-33, 
942-43; Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2126. 
16>3 See Alcan I (2d Cir.) , 755 F. Supp. at 540; Western Processing, 734 F. Supp. at 932, 942; 
Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2126. Part of a court's willingness to reach an inference may 
derive from familiarity with the factual event being inferred. Compare Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) at 2126 (allowing inference that paint would separate) with New Castle County, 769 
F. Supp. at 597 (disallowing inference that unbonded monomers disassociate from polymers). 
169 See, e.g., New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. at 597 (considering release of unbonded mole-
cules from polymer). 
170 See, e.g., id. at 597-98. 
171 See infra part III.B.2. 
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such as a series of truckloads or dumpsters.172 In these cases plaintiffs 
invite courts to infer the presence of some hazardous substance in the 
waste stream in two ways.l7:l The plaintiff may invite the court to infer 
the presence of hazardous items in the waste by pointing to the type 
of business conducted by the defendant,174 or by pointing to the usual 
characteristics of a generic waste stream.175 
An example of an offer of proof drawing on a defendant's business 
activities occured in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha [hereinafter Murtha 
/VJ.176 There, the plaintiff presented evidence about the types of ac-
tivity in which the generator defendants were engaged and urged the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to infer 
the presence of some hazardous substance based on the nature of the 
generator defendant's business.177 The court took a restrictive position 
172 Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. 539, 543-44 (D. Conn. 1993); United States v. Atlas Minerals & 
Chern., Inc., No. 91-5118, 1993 WL 518421, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1993). 
J7:l See Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 544 (focusing on business activity); Atlas Minerals, No. 
91-5118, 1993 WL 518421, at *2 (focusing on type of waste). 
174 See Murtha IV, 840 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (D. Conn. 1993) (plaintiff arguing that service 
station's waste would contain hazardous substances); Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 544 (restricting 
inference based on business activity). 
175 Atlas Minerals, No. 91-5118, 1993 WL 518421, at *2 (offering expert testimony based on 
profile of normal office waste). 
176 See 840 F. Supp. at 183-84. 
177 Id.; see Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 544. Generator defendants were engaged in activities 
such as automobile repair, construction contracting, running a restaurant, owning a pharmacy, 
and light manufacturing. Murtha IV, 840 F. Supp. at 183-9l. 
The plaintiffs sought to assess liability on defendants that disposed of materials such as 
cleaning supplies, light bulbs, bug traps, office waste, soiled paper towels, and tires. Id. at 
184-86. Despite the concession that some of these products undeniably contained listed hazard-
ous substances, the court did not impose CERCLA's burdensome liability for disposal of waste 
of this type. Id. The court granted the summary judgment motions of seventeen generator 
defendants based on a finding that the waste these defendants generated did not contain 
hazardous waste. Id. at 184-9l. 
In deciding the motions of a coffee shop and a residential real estate management company, 
the court noted that discarded containers of cleaning products, which plaintiff's experts testified 
contained several enumerated hazardous substances, were not shown to have other than min-
uscule amounts of residue. Id. at 184. The court relied on a conclusion it had reached in a previous 
hearing of the same case. Id. at 188 (citing Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 545-46). There, the court 
held that notwithstanding the hazardous constituent elements of a manufactured product, a 
product is not a hazardous substance unless the EPA has chosen to list the product as a 
hazardous substance. Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 545-46. To the extent that the court in Murtha 
IV, 840 F. Supp. at 180, relied on the minuscule amounts of hazardous substances in household 
products as a reason to deny hazardous status, such reliance is in tension with the avowed 
judicial standard that there is no quantitative threshold to CERCLA liability. See Alcan II (2d 
Cir.), 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 1993) (defendant liable though waste contained levels of hazard-
ous substances lower than naturally occurring background levels of same substances). See cases 
cited supra note 83. 
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in allowing inferences based on the defendant's line of business, 17S and 
stated that, 
[t]he fact that studies suggest that, cumulatively, a particular 
business generates HS [hazardous substances] does not prove 
that one engaged in that business necessarily, or probably, gener-
ates HS unless it is shown that everyone so engaged generated 
HS, or that the business could not be conducted without generat-
ing HS. Further it would have to be shown that a TPD [third 
party defendant] was engaged in that business as it was defined 
by the studies.179 
Under the second approach, instead of focusing on the activity 
engaged in by the generator defendant, the plaintiff categorizes the 
type of waste disposed of by the defendant and invites the court to 
infer the presence of hazardous substances on this basis. ISO For exam-
ple, in United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chemicals, Inc., the plaintiff 
presented expert testimony about the generator defendant's office 
waste. lSI The plaintiff's expert concluded that based on knowledge of 
what office waste generally contains, the waste in question was haz-
ardous.182 The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania was unwilling to allow the inference that the defen-
dant's office waste contained hazardous substances and granted sum-
mary judgment.183 
In contrast to this outcome, the plaintiff in B.F Goodrich Co. v. 
Murtha [hereinafter Murtha 1] had some success surviving summary 
judgment when the waste stream in question was municipal solid 
waste (MSW).I84 Given the large quantity of MSW, the court appeared 
178 See Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 544. 
179Id. 
ISO Compare id. with United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc., No. 91-5118, 1993 WL 
518421, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1993). 
181 Atlas Minerals, No. 91-5118, 1993 WL 518421, at *2. 
182 Id. 
188 I d. at *6. 
184 Murtha I, 754 F. Supp. 960, 968-74 (D. Conn. 1991), aiI'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). In 
fact, the plaintiffs case against the municipal generator defendants had an extended history. In 
1991, the district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Id. The appellate 
court upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment for the municipal generator 
defendants. Murtha II, 958 F.2d 1192, 1206 (2d Cir. 1992). In early 1993, the district court allowed 
plaintiffs to proceed against municipal generators, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were 
sufficiently well grounded in fact to warrant further proceedings. Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 
547. Finally, on close consideration of the factual basis of the expert's testimony, the court 
granted the summary judgment motions of some of the municipal generator defendants. Murtha 
IV, 840 F. Supp. 180, 189 (D. Conn. 1993). 
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more willing to accept expert reports and generic studies as probative 
of the contents of MSW.IS5 The plaintiff had presented sufficient evi-
dence to support an inference that the MSW contained hazardous 
substances. ls6 Thus the court denied the generator defendants' sum-
mary judgment motions on the basis of probabilistic evidence from 
generic studies. ls7 Ultimately, however, the plaintiff was unable to 
show that the expert testimony about the existence of hazardous 
substances in the MSW had an adequate factual basis and the court 
granted the summary judgment motions of several municipal gener-
ators. lSS 
Thus, courts historically have displayed a range of attitudes toward 
making intermediate inferences necessary to finding generator liabil-
ity under CERCLA.ls9 Courts have been relatively willing to infer 
disposal of waste at a facility.l90 Courts have been somewhat willing 
to infer that a specific substance was hazardous depending on 
the characteristics of the particular substance.191 Courts have been 
relatively unwilling to infer from generic studies that a stream of 
waste contained hazardous substances.192 Building on this histori-
cal background, more recent court decisions reflect both an evolv-
ing attitude toward permitting intermediate inferences and a 
more refined, though implicit, approach toward reaching the ultimate 
inference.193 
1H5 See Murtha I, 745 F. Supp. at 972. The expert reports and generic studies stated that .3% 
to .4% of MSW were hazardous substances. Id. The plaintiffs' expert also found 11 hazardous 
substances typical of MSW landfill leachate at the sites being litigated. Id. Moreover, the court 
saw no reason "MSW from the Connecticut municipalities should radically differ from the MSW 
covered in the studies." Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See id. Although an inference may be drawn as to hazardous substances in MSW, courts 
do not allow inferences about the composition of the waste of individual generators whose waste 
flows into MSW. See, e.g., Murtha III, 815 F. Supp. at 544. In addition, where the waste stream 
that a generator disposed of at a site not being litigated contained hazardous substances, a court 
will not allow an inference that the material the generator disposed of at the site being litigated 
was hazardous. See, e.g., id. at 546. 
188 Murtha IV, 840 F. Supp. at 189. 
189 See cases cited supra notes 115-88. 
190 See supra part lILA. 
191 See supra part III.B.1. 
192 See supra part IILB.2. 
193 See infra part IV. For definition of intermediate and ultimate inference as used in this 
Comment, see supra note 112. 
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IV. MAKING SUMMARY JUDGMENT EASIER FOR CERCLA 
GENERATOR DEFENDANTS THROUGH RESTRICTIVE TREATMENT 
OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: DANA194 AND ACME195 
A. Dana: Setting the Standard For Judging Plaintiff's Burden of 
Production in CERCLA Generator Liability Cases 
1. Statement of the Standard in Dana 
In Dana, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana addressed 
an issue not clearly answered by other courts: what sort of show-
ing, short of direct evidence that a defendant's hazardous waste 
was disposed of at the site in question, will suffice to allow a 
CERCLA plaintiff to survive a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, and hence survive a summary judgment motion.196 
Although the Dana court may not have been the first court to face 
this question,J97 the court's opinion contains a clear statement of the 
standard to apply to circumstantial evidence when considering a de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment.I98 The court concluded that 
a "plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to support, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, a finding that a defendant's hazardous waste 
was disposed of at the site in question."199 The court further stated 
that a "plaintiff may satisfy this burden through the use of circum-
stantial evidence."2oo 
The test contains two elements.20l As the court stated in more 
concrete language, a plaintiff will survive summary judgment if it can 
show (1) that "the defendant produced a continuous and predictable 
waste stream that included hazardous substances of the sort eventu-
ally found at the site,"202 and (2) "that at least some significant part of 
that continuous and predictable waste stream was disposed of at the 
site."203 In the Dana court's opinion, such a showing is sufficient to 
194 866 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
195 870 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
196 Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489. 
197 See supra part III. 
19H See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
202 Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489. 
20:1 [d. 
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support an inference by the factfinder that a defendant's hazardous 
waste was disposed of at the site, and allow a plaintiff to survive 
summary judgment.204 
Conversely, if a plaintiff cannot show that a defendant produced a 
continuous and predictable waste stream that includes hazardous con-
stituents, or that a significant part of the defendant's waste stream 
was disposed of at the site, a reasonable factfinder could not infer that 
the defendant is a responsible party.205 In that case, a court should 
grant summary judgment for the defendant unless the plaintiff has 
some further, more concrete evidence.206 
Having announced the standard, the court applied that standard to 
the summary judgment motions of mUltiple generator defendants.207 
The court's application of the standard further illuminated the plain-
tiff's burden of production to survive summary judgment.208 
2. Treatment of Dual Intermediate Inferences In a Single Test 
Proof that a defendant disposed of hazardous waste at a facility209 
consists of showing that the defendant's waste contained hazardous 
substances and that the defendant's waste was disposed of at the 
facility.210 Although the Dana court was careful to review the factual 
bases of these showings independently,211 the court always considered 
both pieces together before reaching the ultimate inference.212 The 
Dana court implicitly weighed the degree of certainty as to each 
element, and only allowed the ultimate inference where the combined 
weights appeared sufficient.21:l 
The Dana court's treatment of generator defendant Syracuse Rub-
ber was illustrative of what the court required before concluding that 
a generator defendant's waste contained a hazardous substance.214 
Syracuse Rubber produced 100 batches of raw rubber daily and every 
204 See id. 
205 [d. 
206 See id. 
207 Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1503-35. 
20H See id. 
209 Such a showing brings the defendant within the scope of CERCLA liability. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3); see also supra part n.B (for detailed discussion of elements of CERCLA liability). 
210 See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489. 
211 See, e.g., id. at 1529-30 (considering existence of hazardous substance in waste and then 
considering disposal at facility by defendant Syracuse Rubber). 
212 See, e.g., id. at 1531; see also infra part V. 
21:1 See, e.g., Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1531. Analysis and critique of this test in Dana is the subject 
of Part V of this Comment. 
214 See id. at 1528-31. 
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day discarded into its general waste stream the packaging of the 
additives used in manufacturing rubber goods.215 The additives in-
cluded listed hazardous substances.216 Plaintiffs alleged that the addi-
tive packaging would have contained residues of hazardous sub-
stances217 and that hazardous substances were therefore "ubiquitous" 
in the defendant's waste.218 
The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
despite the court's finding that "the percentage of Syracuse Rubber 
waste disposed of at the Site would fall between 0% and 50% of the 
waste actually hauled by [the waste hauler], most likely at the lower 
end of the range."219 Although the court did not grant the summary 
judgment motion of Syracuse Rubber, the court did grant the sum-
mary judgment motions of every other generator defendant.22o The 
plaintiff's case against Syracuse Rubber survived summary judgment 
because there was a high enough degree of certainty as to the inter-
mediate inference that the waste contained hazardous substances.221 
Although evidence as to the other intermediate inference-that the 
waste was disposed of at the facility-was weak, the court determined 
that on balance there was sufficient evidence to support the ultimate 
inference.222 
In contrast to this situation, a different situation occurred as to 
defendant City of Warsaw, a municipal waste generator.223 The plain-
tiff proved with direct evidence that the generator defendant dis-
posed of twenty loads of waste at the site during a ten-day period in 
1975.224 Because the disposal element was proven, the crucial question 
was whether the defendant's waste contained hazardous sub-
stances.225 The plaintiff offered testimony of the defendant's waste 
supervisor describing the waste as probably containing paint cans, 
batteries, and oil filters.226 The plaintiff also offered testimony of an 
expert who opined on the materials likely to have been in the waste 
215 [d. at 1528-29. 
216 [d. at 1528 n.278. 
217 [d. at 1528-29. 
21~ Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1529. 
21" [d. at 1531. 
220 See id. at 1535. 
221 See id. at 1530-31. 
222 See id. at 1531. 
22:1 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1505-06. 
224 [d. at 1505 & n.68. 
225 See id. at 1505-06. 
226 [d. at 1505. 
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stream and concluded there were hazardous substances in the defen-
dant's waste.227 So unconvincing to the court was the plaintiff's show-
ing that the defendant's waste contained hazardous substances that, 
despite proof on the disposal element, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.228 Thus, even though one inter-
mediate inference was unnecessary because of proof by direct evi-
dence, in light of the weakness of proof offered to support the other 
intermediate inference, the court was unwilling to allow the ultimate 
inference.229 
The court also faced situations where both elements were in doubt, 
such as in the case against defendant Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. 
(Huber Hunt).23o A driver for the waste hauler that was seeking 
contribution from generator defendants estimated that seventy-five 
to eighty percent of Huber Hunt's waste was disposed of at the site.231 
Further, the plaintiff presented direct testimony of the driver stating 
that the waste stream contained paint cans, shingles, tar paper, and 
five-gallon buckets of roofing tar.232 The court was willing to assume 
that the plaintiff presented evidence showing the defendant's con-
struction waste contained hazardous substances.233 Nonetheless, be-
cause there was no direct proof of disposal at the facility, the court 
was not willing to infer that the defendant's hazardous waste reached 
the facility.234 Thus, although one intermediate inference was fairly 
well supported, because the second intermediate inference was sup-
ported too poorly, on balance the court would not permit the ultimate 
inference.235 Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant.236 
Similarly, the court granted summary judgment to defendant 
American Standard, Inc. because the plaintiff presented too little 
227 See id. at 1506. Much like the ultimate treatment of the expert affidavit in Murtha IV, 840 
F. Supp. 180, 187-88 (D. Conn. 1993), the court in Dana was unwilling to credit this testimony 
as having the factual foundation necessary to establish the contents of this particular MSW 
generator's waste. See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1506. 
228 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1506. 
229 See id. 
2;;0 Id. at 1516-18. 
231 Id. at 1517. The court was clearly skeptical of this driver's testimony and appeared to 
discount the probative value of the testimony despite recognizing that "the summary judgment 
stage is not the time to weigh evidence." See id. 
232 Id. 
233 Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1517. 
234 Id. at 1518. 
2;]5 See id. 
236 Id. 
1995] GENERATOR LIABILITY 155 
evidence to support both intermediate inferences.237 An employee of 
the defendant testified that the general production waste contained 
"vinyl, oil and oil filters, brake fluid, transmission fluid, lacquer, used 
paint filters, five-gallon buckets containing solvent based paint, paint 
scrapings, adhesives, and alkaline cleaners."238 The plaintiffs expert 
established that such waste products contained listed hazardous sub-
stances.239 The defendant's employee also testified that the general 
production waste was disposed of in "roll-off containers" provided by 
the waste hauler during several months in 1977 or 1978 when com-
pactor trucks were not provided by the waste hauler.240 Testimony of 
one of the waste haulers indicated that he took roll-off containers from 
the defendant to the site.241 According to the waste hauler, however, 
the waste in the roll-off containers that he hauled did not include 
general production waste.242 Moreover, the plaintiff presented no evi-
dence that compactor trucks were not available when that waste 
hauler took roll-off containers from the defendant to the site.243 Thus, 
the plaintiff presented too little evidence to adequately support both 
intermediate inferences and the court was unwilling to reach the 
ultimate inference.244 
B. Acme: Continuing Favorable Treatmentfor CERCLA 
Generator Defendants at the Summary Judgment Stage 
In Acme,245 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin considered the summary judgment motions of 
twelve "fast track" CERCLA generator defendants.246 Like the court 
in Dana,247 the Acme court considered both independent elements 
together in determining whether to reach the ultimate inference.248 
237 See id. at 1503--04. 




242 See id. 
243 Da1UL, 866 F. Supp. at 1503--04. 
244 See id. (granting the generator defendant's motion for summary judgment). 
245 870 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
246 [d. at 1481. "Fast track" apparently referred to expedited consideration given the motions 
of these defendants. See id. "These defendants generally argue either that they did not dispose 
of hazardous wastes at the ... site or that the waste they did deposit did not contain hazardous 
substances." [d. 
247 See supra part IV.A. 
248 See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483 (defendant Bel-Aire deposited waste at the facility; 
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Also like the court in Dana,249 the Acme court was generally unwilling 
to allow the ultimate inference from the plaintiff's circumstantial evi-
dence.25o 
In the case against defendant Bel-Aire, the defendant was a paving 
contractor that removed and paved driveways, sidewalks, and streets 
for private residences and municipalities in the Milwaukee area.251 
Bel-Aire disposed of broken concrete and dirt at the site, but denied 
disposing of any hazardous materials, including the asphalt that the 
plaintiff alleged.252 Pointing to the type of business the defendant 
conducted, the plaintiff alleged that Bel-Aire "must have" disposed of 
asphalt at the facility.253 In addition, the plaintiff presented evidence 
that "the site contained large amounts of asphalt intermixed with 
broken concrete"254 and urged the court to infer the asphalt had come 
from Bel-Aire. 255 The court held that the plaintiff had failed to produce 
sufficient evidence that the defendant's waste was hazardous and 
granted summary judgment to the defendant.256 
The case against defendant Cardinal Fabricating further revealed 
the court's attitude toward extending generator liability.257 There, the 
defendant conceded, for the purposes of summary judgment only, that 
its waste contained hazardous substances.258 Cardinal Fabricating de-
nied, however, disposing of waste at the site in question.259 In consid-
plaintiff could not prove the waste was hazardous; court granted defendant's summary judg-
ment motion). See also supra note 112 for definition of terms used in this Comment and supra 
part II.B for information on elements of CERCLA liability. 
249 See supra part IV.A. 
250 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1499 (granting 10 of 13 generator defendants' motions for 
summary judgment on CERCLA liability). 
251 [d. at 1483. 
252 [d. The court noted without elaboration that asphalt "contains hazardous substances." [d. 
253 [d. 
254 [d. 
255 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483. 
256 [d. The court appeared to give weight to the testimony of a driver employed by the 
trucking company that owned the site. See id. Although the defendant apparently used its own 
trucks and drivers to take waste to the site, the court credited the testimony of the driver for 
the trucking firm-that he never saw the defendant dump other than concrete or ground-as 
establishing that all the defendant's wastes were nonhazardous. See id. The court reached this 
factual conclusion despite claiming to view "the evidence in a light most favorable to [the 
plaintiffJ." [d. 
257 See id. at 1486. 
258 [d. at 1486 n.6. The defendant fabricated steel beams and columns for the construction 
industry. [d. at 1486. The defendant painted fabricated products with paint primers that con-
tained several hazardous substances. [d. 
259 [d. 
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ering whether the plaintiff met the burden of production of evidence, 
the court again gave weight to the testimony of the truck driver 
employed by the site owner.260 The driver testified that the firm's 
practice was to dispose of only solid waste at the site while taking 
rubbish, like that admittedly disposed of by the defendant, to another 
dump.261 In spite of there being hazardous wastes consistent with the 
type generated by the defendant at the site, the court found that the 
plaintiffs argument "amount[ed] to little more than speculation."262 
Thus, the court would not permit the ultimate inference and granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.263 
The court was even more permissive in granting the summary 
judgment motion of generator defendant Service Painting Corpora-
tion.264 The plaintiff contended that the defendant's stream of waste 
sand-blasting sand also contained paint cans, and therefore would 
have been hazardous.265 The court stated that "this conclusion is not 
unreasonable."266 Furthermore, the plaintiff presented evidence that 
"waste found at the site was consistent with the sort of waste [the 
defendant] would have generated."267 In fact, when the waste hauler 
was shown photographs of containers excavated from the site, he 
testified that it was "very possible" that the containers came from the 
defendant.268 Yet, because the paint cans were relatively common, the 
court would not infer the waste came from the defendant and granted 
summary judgment.269 
In summary, the court in Acme was extremely restrictive in allow-
ing inferences against generator defendants.27o 
260 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1486. 
261 [d. For the court to give this testimony great weight was somewhat misguided. Had the 
trucking firm adhered to such policies, no rubbish containing hazardous substances would have 
been found at the site. See id. Such wastes were present at the site, however, and the driver 
admitted to not following the disposal policy on occasion. See id. at 1485. Thus, for this testimony 
to establish a factual presumption against the plaintiff is odd if the court was really viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 1486. 
262 [d. at 1486. 
2"'1 [d. 
264 See id. at 1494-96. 
265 Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1495. 
266 [d. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. The containers in question were five-gallon paint cans that apparently would have 
contained hazardous substances. See id. 
269 See id. at 1496. The court admitted that the plaintiff offered better proof that this defendant 
disposed of hazardous waste at the facility than the plaintiff had offered against the other 
"fast-track" defendants, but still held that the case rested largely on speculation. [d. 
270 See Acme, 870 F. Supp at 1483-98 (granting 10 of 13 motions for summary judgment). In 
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V. A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
RULINGS ON CERCLA GENERATOR DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
A. CERCLA's Perceived Unfairness as an Explanation for the 
Uniform Granting of Summary Judgment 
Statutorily and judicially mandated characteristics of CERCLA 
make it relatively easy for plaintiffs to state a prima facie case of 
liability.271 And yet, essential facts may be difficult for plaintiffs to 
prove by direct evidence, especially in generator cases.272 Defendants 
naturally seek escape from the cruel specter of continuing CERCLA 
litigation and enormous liability for remedial costs273 by challenging 
the factual premises of plaintiffs' cases with motions for summary 
judgment.274 
As laid out previously, a plaintiff must show both that the 
defendant's waste was hazardous and that the defendant's hazard-
ous waste reached the facility before CERCLA liability will 
attach.275 In addition, courts add the requirement that generic hazard-
ous substances like those in the defendant's waste be pre-
sent at the site at the time of the release.276 By presenting direct 
fact, the plaintiff subsequently motioned for reconsideration, arguing that the court had "re-
solved issues of witness credibility and impermissibly weighed inferences reasonably drawn 
from the evidence." Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., No. 89-C-834, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10245, at *13 (E.D. Wis. June 29, 1995) [hereinafter Acme II]. On reconsideration, the 
court let stand the earlier grants of summary judgment. Id. at *20. Moreover, the court flatly 
stated that "Rule 56 ... is especially important under statutes with broad, sweeping liability 
such as CERCLA." Id. 
271 See supra part II.B for elements of CERCLA claim and notes 83--88 and accompanying 
text for aspects of CERCLA that facilitate plaintiffs case. 
272 See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483-98 (assessing lack of factual clarity as to 13 generator 
defendants); Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1503-34 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (assessing lack of factual clarity 
as to 10 generator defendants); see also supra part IV. 
278 See supra note 2. 
274 See supra part III. See, e.g., Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483-98 (denying either disposal or 
hazardous elements); Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1535 (ruling on summary judgment motions of 10 
defendants); Murtha IV, 840 F. Supp. 180, 183-91 (D. Conn. 1993) (entertaining summary 
judgment motions of 37 defendants). 
275 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 
F.2d 160, 169 n.15 (4th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff must merely "present evidence that a generator 
defendant's waste was shipped to the site and that hazardous substances similar to those 
contained in the defendant's waste remained present at the time of release"), cert. denied, 490 
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evidence, a plaintiff passes the threshold of sufficiency relatively 
easily.277 
Where a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence, however, courts 
have to determine how permissive to be in making critical infer-
ences.278 Evaluating the inferences requires a court to engage in pre-
trial factfinding where subjective values may play a determinative 
role.279 In CERCLA generator liability cases, the perception of unfair-
ness in CERCLA's liability scheme may color judicial reaction to the 
proffered inferences.280 
Accordingly, the results of recent CERCLA generator liability 
cases have been relatively uniform in discrediting inculpatory circum-
stantial evidence and refusing to draw inferences in the nonmoving 
plaintiff's favor.281 Some of this uniformity is a result of Matsushita, 
Liberty Lobby, and Celotex, where the Supreme Court coaxed lower 
courts to lighten their caseloads through increased use of summary 
judgment.282 The most important impact of the Supreme Court trilogy 
in the CERCLA context, however, is that these cases authorize trial 
judges to weigh facts and assess the comparative plausibility of infer-
u.s. 1106 (1989). This requirement is curious in light of the judicial standard that the plaintiff 
does not have to prove either causation or fingerprinting. See, e.g., Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 
805 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D. Ariz. 1992) (only causation issue is whether release caused plaintiff to 
incur response costs); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (no 
, fingerprinting requirement); see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. Perhaps, show-
ing the presence, at the site at the time of release, of generic hazardous substances like those 
in the defendant's waste stands as a surrogate for causation, indicating judicial unwillingness to 
stray too far, or too quickly from traditional tort concepts. See Nagle, supra note 9, at 1524-31 
(criticizing CERCLA's lack of proximate cause requirement). Just as likely, courts require this 
showing to reinforce the plaintiffs proof as to whether the defendant actually disposed of 
hazardous waste at the site, implicitly indicating judicial unease with reliance on wholly circum-
stantial evidence. See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1489. 
2:l7 See 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 31, § 339. 
2:lS See supra part IV. 
279 See Stempel, supra note 45, at 107-08. 
280 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text for discussion of CERCLA's perceived 
unfairness. See supra note 62 for discussion of subjectivity in summary judgments. In addition, 
when deciding the plaintiffs motions for reconsideration, the Acme court intimated its prefer-
ence for limiting CERCLA liability through summary judgment. See Acme II, No. 89-C-834, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10245, at *20 (E.D. Wis. June 29, 1995) ("Rule 56 ... is especially 
important under statutes with broad, sweeping liability such as CERCLA."). 
281 See supra part IV. 
282 See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 107 (charac-
terizing trio of cases as exhortation to trial judges to "loosen up" and grant more summary 
judgments). 
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ences at the summary judgment stage.283 This fact-finding power en-
ables trial judges to act instrumentally, creating a subjective filter on 
facts and inferences that leads inexorably to the outcome the judge 
favors.284 
The generally perceived unfairness of CERCLA liability is a major 
reason for the uniformity in recent CERCLA summary judgment 
decisions.285 Federal trial judges with fact-finding power have cut back 
on suits against generator defendants in accordance with their own 
subjective values.286 For example, a judge may grant summary judg-
ment against a plaintiff because the judge disagrees with the scope of 
CERCLA's liability scheme or is sympathetic to a small business that 
disposed, legally at the time, of a small quantity of "hazardous" 
waste.287 
Moreover, CERCLA liability cases that rely on circumstantial evi-
dence are particularly vulnerable to instrumental decisionmaking. 
The unique vulnerability derives from the need to draw two inde-
pendent inferences before reaching the ultimate inference that a de-
fendant is liable.288 The necessary stacking of inferences implicates a 
reasoning process analogous to the "product rule" of probability the-
ory.289 Where courts raise the burden of production required to sur-
vive summary judgment up to the preponderance standard, summary 
judgment will likely issue because the "product" is so likely to be 
283 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra part IV. 
286 See supra part V. Fairness is a noble goal, and one that judges in CERCLA actions rightly 
seek to encourage. Releasing individual responsible parties from clean-up costs, however, should 
not be regarded universally as the preferred solution. If this solution is used, the threats caused 
by hazardous waste disposal will remain and the costs of cleanup will be externalized by 
generators and fall on the taxpayer. Thus, fairness to some parties may conflict with fairness to 
other parties and certainly would work to defeat CERCLNs purposes. 
287 Here "hazardous" is used in quotation marks to signal that some common wastes, such as 
paints or cleaning products, may not raise real concern in some judges, even though these 
substances contain listed constituent elements. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
289 See supra note 113. 
Consider four permutations of the strength of the intermediate inferences. If both interme-
diate inferences are supported by highly probative evidence, the court should easily reach the 
ultimate inference and deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment. If neither interme-
diate inference is supported by plausible evidence, the court should grant the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. More difficult cases occur when both intermediate inferences are 
supported by some, though by no means obviously sufficient, evidence, and when one interme-
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below the fifty percent preponderance threshold.290 Thus, circumstan-
tial evidence cases against CERCLA generator defendants are espe-
cially likely to fail at the summary judgment stage and may be para-
digmatic examples of the increase of "false exculpation" error 
predicted by commentators in the wake of Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, 
and Celotex.291 
B. Refusal To Draw the Ultimate Inference: Examples of 
"Product Rule" Reasoning in Dana and Acme 
The linguistic formulation of the standard set out in Dana-that 
the "plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to support, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, a finding that a defendant's hazardous 
waste was disposed of at the site in question" -is an appropriate 
diate inference is fairly well supported and the other intermediate inference is very much in 
question. 
Ruling on Ruling on 
Probability of Defendant's Defendant's 
Probability of Probability of Ultimate Motion Motion 
Scenario Inference 1 Inference 2 Inference (Expected) (Observed) 
1 >70% >70% >50 Deny Deny 
2 <30% <30% <09 Grant Grant 
3 35-65% 35-65% 12-42% Grant 
4 90-100% 10-45% 09-45% Grant 
This relationship can be illustrated by statistics. In general, when two events are statistically 
independent of one another, the likelihood that both events will occur is the product of the 
likelihood that each would occur. See supra note 113. Where the probability of each occurrence 
is less than one, or 100%, the product of the two will be lower than the probability of the least 
likely occurrence. Thus, a situation may occur where each independent event is more likely than 
not to occur, and each event appears to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard. The 
occurrence of both events, however, is not very likely or does not appear likely enough to 
support a finding. As the degree of certainty of one intermediate inference begins to approach 
the extreme of 100%, the ultimate inference becomes easier to draw. If the product of the 
probabilities of the two events exceeds 50%, the preponderance of the evidence standard is met 
and the plaintiff should survive summary judgment. The difficulty of application of the "product 
rule" model arises from the necessity of quantifying the "sufficient to support a finding" stand-
ard by which summary judgments are measured. 
If courts in fact raise the burden of production of evidence to equal the burden of persuasion 
at trial, summary judgment will be granted in Scenarios 3 and 4 in the above chart because the 
product of the independent parts is always less than the 50% preponderance threshold. 
290 See supra note 289. 
291 See supra note 62. 
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starting point for analysis.292 This statement of the standard to apply 
to a generator defendant's motion for summary judgment indicates 
that the court heard the call of Liberty Lobby and raised the standard 
to survive summary judgment up to the burden of persuasion at 
trial.293 The standard refers both to sufficiency of evidence to support 
a finding, and proof by a preponderance of the evidence.294 Certainly, 
the Dana court set a much higher hurdle than that set by courts in 
Conservation Chemical, United States v. Price, and United States v. 
Wade.295 In fact, the Dana court's application of the standard to indi-
vidual generator defendants revealed a reluctance to draw inferences 
against generators and confirmed the relevance of the "product rule" 
reasoning model,296 
Treatment of generator defendant Syracuse Rubber comports with 
the proposition that courts use a reasoning process analogous to the 
"product rule."297 Because one element of liability-the existence of 
hazardous substance in the waste stream-approached a likelihood of 
100%, the court appeared willing to allow the ultimate inference even 
though the amount of the defendant's waste that reached the site was 
in question.298 The court was not free to refuse the ultimate inference 
because the disposal element was the subject of direct testimony 
presented by the plaintiff.299 Thus, where direct evidence established 
one element at 100%, and indirect evidence established the other 
element at near 100%, the court permitted the ultimate inference.30o 
Although the court reached a different result by granting the sum-
mary judgment motion of the City of Warsaw, a generator of munici-
pal solid waste, the analysis still comports with "product rule" reason-
ing.30l The plaintiff proved beyond doubt that the generator defendant 
disposed of waste at the facility.302 Despite testimony describing the 
contents of the waste and an expert's conclusion that the waste con-
292 Dana, 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1489 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
293 See id. 
294 See id. 
295 See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. 
296 See infra notes 309-44. 
297 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1528-3l. 
29R See id. at 153l. 
299 See id. at 1530. "Mr. Call testified that he picked up Syracuse Rubber roll-offs and that he 
disposed of about 15% of the waste at the Site." Id. 
:lOO See id. at 153l. 
:101Id. at 1506. 
302 Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1505. 
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tained hazardous substances,:Jo3 the court was not satisfied that the 
plaintiff had met the burden to produce evidence about the hazardous 
nature of the defendant's waste.304 Because the court found almost 
completely implausible the inference that the waste was hazardous, 
application of "product rule" reasoning pointed toward granting sum-
mary judgment.305 
Although the decision model was similar to that used for Syracuse 
Rubber, the court reached a different result for the City of Warsaw.306 
In both cases, the plaintiff attempted to prove that the defendant's 
waste contained hazardous substances by presenting circumstantial 
evidence.307 The court may have been more permissive in granting the 
summary judgment motion of the City of Warsaw because the defen-
dant was a municipality, a relatively sympathetic defendant.30s The 
disparate treatment of these two generator defendants reveals a 
court's power to act instrumentally.309 The Dana court appeared to 
discredit facts and reject inferences to reach results that best com-
ported with the court's subjective notions of equity.310 
Treatment of defendant Huber Hunt is another example of the 
Dana court's unwillingness to draw inferences against generator de-
fendants in CERCLA liability actions.3U Despite a driver's testimony 
that seventy-five to eighty percent of the defendant's waste reached 
the site, and some evidence that the waste contained hazardous sub-
stances, the court granted the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion.312 In reaching this conclusion, the court intimated that the ulti-
mate inference would have to be more likely than not before the court 
would allow such an inference.3l3 The court appeared skeptical of the 
driver's testimony establishing the disposal element, and subjectively 
30:1Id. 
304 Id. at 1506. 
305 See id. 
:106 See id. at 1531. 
307 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1505-06, 1529. 
308 See id. at 1505. 
:109 See id. at 1528-31. 
:1I0 See id. 
311 See id. at 1516--18. 
312 See Dana, 866 F. Supp. at 1518. 
313 See id. at 1517. "At best, the evidence is sufficient to show that some Huber Hunt waste 
went to the Site; the evidence does not support an inference that it is more likely than not that 
any of Huber Hunt's waste taken to the Site contained hazardous substances." Id. Thus, the 
court reiterated the proposition that the plaintiff's burden equaled the burden of persuasion at 
trial. See id. 
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discredited this testimony under the authority of Liberty Lobby.314 
Nothing in the record hints that Huber Hunt was an especially sym-
pathetic plaintiff.:115 Here, the perception of unfairness in CERCLA's 
liability scheme may best explain the court's decision. 
The court's behavior in Acme316 was parallel to that in Dana, espe-
cially in the way the Acme court weighed the facts presented by the 
plaintiff.317 Although the court in Acme purported to be "viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff],"318 the court actu-
ally screened facts through a subjective filter, crediting facts pre-
sented by the defendant while discrediting those presented by the 
plaintiff.319 
In the case against Bel-Aire, the plaintiff presented evidence that 
Bel-Aire dumped dirt and broken concrete at the site.320 Although the 
plaintiff showed that asphalt, a hazardous substance, was intermixed 
with such wastes, the court rejected the inference that the asphalt 
came from the defendant.321 The court rejected this inference despite 
the fact that the defendant would naturally have found asphalt in the 
driveways, sidewalks, and streets that Bel-Aire removed from paving 
sites.:l22 In discrediting the plaintiff's proposed factual finding, the 
court gave credence to the testimony of an employee of the site 
owner.323 In addition to the self-interested testimony ofthe defendant, 
the court credited the employee's testimony about not seeing the 
defendant dump asphalt as establishing the nonhazardous nature of 
the waste.324 And yet, Bel-Aire apparently dumped at the site without 
being supervised by anyone, let alone the employee whose testimony 
established that the waste was nonhazardous.325 Thus, the court used 
the power to weigh facts subjectively to undercut the plaintiff's 
case.326 
314 See id. 
315 See id. at 1516-18. 
:lln Acme, 870 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
317 See id. at 1483-98. 
318Id. at 1483. 
319 See id. at 1483-98. 
320Id. at 1483. 
:321 Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483. 
322 See id. 
32;1 See id. Both the site owner and the employee were named defendants in the plaintiffs' 
action for contribution. Id. at 1465. 
:124 See id. at 1483. 
325 See id. 
326 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1483-85. 
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Furthermore, the Acme court persisted in finding that testimony 
of the co-defendants, the driver and the site owner, established a 
presumption that certain types of waste were not disposed of at the 
site.327 The site owner and driver testified that the firm's policy was 
to dispose of rubbish at a different site.328 However, rubbish containing 
hazardous material was found at the site and the driver admitted to 
dumping rubbish there on occasion.329 The court preferred to view this 
testimony as establishing a presumption that no defendant's rubbish 
was dumped at the site and used this presumption against the plaintiff 
in several generator cases.330 
Perhaps the most bizarre result in Acme is the court's grant of 
summary judgment to defendant Service Painting Corporation.331 The 
testimony of the driver about whether he had hauled paint cans from 
the defendant was contradictory.332 Moreover, the driver was shown 
photographs of paint cans from the site and testified that it was very 
possible that the cans came from the defendant.333 Nonetheless, the 
court stated that paint cans were a "relatively common waste" and 
discredited the facts presented by the plaintiff as establishing that 
the cans came from the defendant.334 Because the court resolved the 
disposal element completely in the defendant's favor, the court did not 
even reach the question of whether the waste was hazardous before 
granting summary judgment on the CERCLA claim.335 Thus, the 
court used its fact-finding authority instrumentally to cut back on the 
potential scope of CERCLA liability.336 
327 See id. at 1485. 
328 [d. 
329 [d. 
330 See id. at 1485-97 (pointing to hauler's alleged policy of not taking rubbish to site as 
establishing a fact that plaintiffs must overcome as to defendants Cambridge Chemical, Cardinal 
Fabricating, Hartwig Exhibitions, Lincoln Savings Bank, Service Painting Corporation, and 
Texaco). 
331 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1494-96. 
332 [d. at 1495. 
333 [d. 
334 See id. at 1496. 
335 See id. 
336 See Acme, 870 F. Supp. at 1494-96. In terms of achieving an equitable and socially accept-
able result, the court may further justify the decision for Service Painting by pointing to the 
fact that the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed against Service Painting on a RCRA claim. See 
id. at 1496. Thus, the court may have balanced competing interests by leaving the defendant 
open to some liability. See id. 
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In summary, both the Dana and Acme courts used the full arsenal 
of weapons provided by Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Celotex337 to 
cut off suits against CERCLA generator defendants at the summary 
judgment stage.338 The courts in Dana and Acme raised the plaintiff's 
burden to survive summary judgment to a preponderance level, 
weighed facts instrumentally to ensure favored results, and discarded 
unwanted inferences as implausible.339 Furthermore, these courts ap-
pear to have used a reasoning process analogous to the "product rule" 
to prevent acceptance of the ultimate inference.34o Although none of 
these practices are impermissible under the Supreme Court's sum-
mary judgment regime, judicial activities of this type increase false 
exculpation of CERCLA generator defendants as predicted by com-
mentators.341 Accuracy may not be the most important goal for courts 
deciding whether to impose liability on small businesses,342 especially 
in light of CERCLA's problematic liability provisions.343 Nevertheless, 
if unstated, subjective biases create legally inexplicable CERCLA 
liability decisions, litigants will perceive less, not more, fairness in the 
system. Therefore, a more rational and aboveboard approach to de-
ciding generator liability is necessary.344 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has attempted to provide background information 
on summary judgment and CERCLA liability necessary for consid-
eration of a CERCLA generator defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. In reviewing decisions in this area, this Comment has 
found a judicial trend toward taking advantage of the opportunity 
provided by Liberty Lobby to inject subjective considerations into 
summary judgment rulings. Acting instrumentally in reaction to the 
337 See supra notes 45--63 and accompanying text for changes wrought by Matsushita, Liberty 
Lobby, and Celotex. 
338 See supra notes 297-336 and accompanying text for application by Dana and Acme courts. 
339 See supra notes 297-336 and accompanying text. 
340 See supra notes 297-336 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra notes 62, 113. 
342 See supra note 113; see generally N esson, Proof and Acceptability, supra note 12. 
343 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. 
344 There are at least two relatively straightforward ways to allow for explicit recognition of 
the concerns that currently appear to effect judicial decisions, albeit implicitly. First, an expan-
sion of the de minimis exception to liability would allow many more small business waste 
generators to escape liability. Secondly, allowing equitable defenses to liability would bring 
concerns for fairness into the light of day. Both of the measures would afford resolution early 
on, thus also promoting judicial economy. 
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perceived unfairness of CERCLA, courts have used several tools to 
limit the reach of CERCLA liability. Chief among these tools is a 
reasoning process, analogous to the "product rule" from probability 
theory, that inevitably undercuts inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence by lowering the apparent likelihood that a defendant disposed 
of hazardous waste at the litigated facility, and justifies the court in 
finding that the plaintiff's claims are implausible. This Comment ar-
gued that the use of "product rule" reasoning in CERCLA generator 
cases will increase the false exculpation of generators of hazardous 
waste who should be liable under a literal reading of CERCLA. 
Finally, this Comment argued that even though concerns for fairness, 
as subjectively determined by the judge ruling on a summary judg-
ment motion, may explain particular decisions, the varying results of 
this implicit process will ultimately engender a greater perception of 
unfairness in CERCLA liability. 
